In This Issue

Rousseau’s Raid

Notes on the Use of Cavalry in the American Revolution

Avon, CT to Arivaca, Arizona: Back to the Border with the Governor's Horse Guards

The Sometimes War

From the Library: Chief - The Last Cavalry Horse

Specials at the Sutler's Store
The United States Cavalry Association
Organized February 20, 1976

The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to preserve the history, traditions, uniform, and equipment of the United States Cavalry units, including mounted support units, and to sponsor the U.S. Cavalry Museum and U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research library for education's purposes and to preserve literature used by the United States Cavalry throughout its history.

Article IV, Constitution

Officers
President
Cpt. William H. Tempero, USAR
Vice President
Fred Klink
Treasurer
Dennis Bruzina

Board of Directors
Chairman
Vice Chairman
Col. Samuel L. Myers, USA, Ret.
Members
Joan Gard Baird
Frederick E. Klink
Jeffrey L. Maahs
Daniel L. McCluskey
Lindsay Baird Osborn, Esq.
Rev. Paul H. Scholtz
Cpt. William H. Tempero, USAR
Col. W. Glenn Yarborough, USA, Ret.
Sgt. John Husby, USAR
CDR William Kambic, USNR, Ret.
SSgt. Jeffrey Wall, USMC

Staff
Linda Pollock - Office Manager
James Smith - Research Librarian

The Cavalry Journal
Published Quarterly
by
The United States Cavalry Association
Volume XXXVII, Issue 2 June 2012

This edition of the Cavalry Journal is dedicated to the memory of all cavalrymen.

Contents
1......Rousseau’s Raid
6......Notes on the Use of Cavalry in the American Revolution
10.....From the Library: Chief - The Last Cavalry Horse
12.....Avon, CT to Arivaca, Arizona: Back to the Border with the Governor's Horse Guards
16.....The Sometimes War
20.....Specials at the Butler's Store

Join the Cavalry!

ISSN 1074-0252

U.S. Cavalry Association
P.O. Box 2325
Fort Riley, Kansas 66442-0325
785-784-5797

www.us cavalry.org
Email: cavalry@flinthills.com

Editorial and Publication offices: P.O. Box 2325, Fort Riley, Kansas 66442-0325, 785-784-5797
Published four times a year; 1 March, 1 June, 1 September, 1 December
Subscriptions included in Annual Dues; Individual Annual Dues $40.00, Family Annual Membership $55.00, Individual USA Life Memberships Dues $400.00, Organization Annual Dues $45.00, Corporate Annual Dues $500.00, Overseas Annual Dues $60.00
Membership classifications: Charter-Modern Cavalry-Heritage-Regular
All Dues are payable in advance
Single Copies $5.00, Extra copies to members $3.50
U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, Building #247, P.O. Box 2325, Fort Riley, Kansas 66442-0325
Rousseau’s Raid, July 10 – 22, 1864
by
Trooper Phil Bolté

Note: The major source of information for this article was Sherman’s Horsemen: Union Cavalry Operations in the Atlanta Campaign, which is recommended for further reading.

Major General Lovell H. Rousseau, Mexican War veteran, brigade commander during and division commander since Shiloh, was shunted aside in November 1863 as possible corps commander by General Sherman. Rousseau craved to get back in action. In June 1864, he proposed that a mixed force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery be sent south of the Tennessee River to conduct offensive action in Alabama. Rousseau saw this as the way to force Confederates to defend against this force instead of conducting raids in Tennessee. His plan was even more ambitious, for he envisioned striking deep into Alabama to destroy railroads and Confederate supplies and factories.

Rousseau’s proposal found a receptive audience in Major General William T. Sherman, commanding the Union forces advancing on Atlanta. Sherman was already planning as part of his Atlanta campaign to send cavalry raids past that city to cut the rail lines leading into it. The Confederates were now about to retreat across the Chattahoochee River, the last major obstacle to Sherman’s advance. Major General A.J. Smith was about to depart from Memphis with 12,000 cavalry to attack Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest in Mississippi, so the “Wizard of the Saddle” would be fully occupied. It was time to initiate the raids. On June 29, Sherman directed Rousseau to start when Sherman had crossed the Chattahoochee and Smith had engaged Forrest.

Rousseau set about to prepare his expeditionary force, overcoming a shortage of horses, shifting troops, and organizing five cavalry regiments into two brigades, the 1st, commanded by Colonel Thomas J. Harrison—2nd Kentucky, 4th Iowa, and 8th Indiana— and the 2nd, commanded by Colonel William D. Hamilton—9th Ohio and 4th Tennessee. Two 10-pounder Parrott guns of Battery B, 1st Michigan Light Artillery, were added to the 2nd Brigade. Only the artillery limbers and caissons and five regimental ambulances would accompany the column, with all other supplies to be carried by mules. A few additional supply wagons would accompany the column initially and be sent back after the first day.

Rousseau’s plan was to move southeast, striking the Montgomery & West Point Railroad somewhere between Montgomery and Opelika. After destroying the railroad, he would march up the west bank of the Chattahoochee to join Sherman’s army near Marietta. If this proved impractical, he would march south toward the Gulf Coast and Union-occupied Pensacola.

Despite serious shortages of men, horses, and materiel, Rousseau had assembled his force of 2,700 south of the Tennessee River and marched out of Decatur at 1:00 P.M., July 10. By that evening, the column had crossed the Flint River, engaged a few Confederate bushwhackers, and marched 17 miles, bivouacking for the night at Somerville.

Reveille sounded before daylight the next morning. The quartermaster and commissary doled out the last of the corn and hardtack from the wagons and Rousseau directed that any excess items be dispensed with, directing for example, that troopers divest themselves of any ammunition in excess of 120 rounds. By 5:30, the column was on the move again.

Continuing southeast, the column met no opposition. At dusk, a party of forty 8th Indiana troopers charged into a small mountaintop village appropriately named Summit. Their only captures were a handful of Confederate soldiers, all quickly paroled as Rousseau had no desire to add captives to his column. The troops gathered for the night in an open woods, having ridden thirty miles that day. Dinner for the troops was hardtack as forage was scarce in the wooded country.

On the way by five the next morning, Major Meshack Stephens’s 4th Tennessee took the lead and almost immediately ran into a well-laid ambush of Bushwhackers, who were soon
dispersed by the Tennessee troopers. The advance guard headed southwest along the southern flank of Sand Mountain. Before going very far, they surprised and captured a Confederate quartermaster and eighteen soldiers escorting four wagons. The soldiers were paroled and the wagons left for following troops to burn. Not far down the road, the leaders arrived at the first plantation they had encountered, where Rousseau ordered the troops to take whatever supplies they needed. By 10:00 A.M., they had reached Blountsville, a dilapidated town of 300 to 400 inhabitants. Freeing several runaway slaves and Confederate deserters from the county jail and burning some cotton, Rousseau steered his horsemen southeast, downhill into more open country.

Early in the afternoon, they reached the 250 acre farm of James Brown, an individual indifferent about the war, only wanting to be left alone to farm. Foraging was better here for horse and man.

By dark, the column had reached the eastern edge of the plateau at Blount Mountain, where the road dropped 600 feet in less than a mile. With only the moon to guide them, the troopers found the steep terrain challenging, most of them finally dismounting and leading their horses to keep from falling down the slope. The artillerymen found it necessary to unhook the guns, tie ropes around the axles, and carefully belay them down the hill. A mile from the bottom of the slope, the weary troopers were ordered to bivouac. In the last eighteen hours, they had covered forty miles of some of the roughest terrain in Alabama. The 4th Tennessee was ordered, though, to advance to Ashville and capture any Confederate supplies stockpiled there.

Back in the saddle by 6:00 A.M. on July 13, the main column moved along at a walk, occasionally stopping to load up bundles of oats.
curing in the fields along the roadside. The column took four hours to cover the five miles to Ashville. The 4th Tennessee had charged into the town about midnight, routing the small garrison without firing a shot. Most of the townspeople had already fled. The raiders were now in possession of a considerable quantity of Confederate flour, bacon, and corn. The quartermaster and commissary quickly distributed the welcome supplies.

At this point, knowing there was still hard marching ahead, Rousseau directed that all the horses be checked and those needing it be properly shod with the extra shoes each man had carried. Men refreshed and horses reshoed, the troops burned the commissary supplies they could not eat and headed eastward about 2:00 PM. By 8:00, the head of the column had reached the Coosa River at Greensport, fifteen miles east of Ashville.

Two officers of the leading unit, riding somewhat isolated between elements of the column, were suddenly confronted by a half dozen Confederates who sprang from the underbrush. Both were shot as they tried to get away, one badly wounded and the other killed, the first battle casualties of the expedition. Rousseau knew that the Coosa River was his Rubicon and getting 2700 men across would not be easy. Once crossed, there would be no turning back. Any horse or man incapable of going the rest of the way must be winnowed out now. He ordered a thorough inspection of men and horses. Three hundred horses, and even more men, were ordered to be ready to move back to Union lines in the morning.

Rousseau wanted to get a force across the river before dark, hold the eastern approaches to the ferry boat crossing overnight, then move four miles downstream and cover the crossing of the rest of the command at Ten Islands, where the river was fordable. Four companies of the 8th Indiana undertook this task, making slow progress crossing on the single ferry boat, ten men at a time. Scouts reported Rebels close by, but once pickets were posted, the men spent a quiet, if sleepless, night. There were Confederates approaching. Brigadier General James Holt Clanton, having received reports of the approaching Union force, set about to stop the enemy crossing with a small force of Alabama cavalry, 100 from the 6th Alabama and 100 from the 8th Alabama. Although outnumbered six to one, he decided to attack at dawn, one force at the ferry and the other at the potential ford. Meanwhile, he had sent a courier to Talladega urging the commander there to send every man available.

When the distant echo of gunfire came across the river to Rousseau’s bivouac, he immediately sent 100 men across at the ferry as reinforcements and the rest of his command downstream. When Clanton’s dismounted troopers attacked the reinforced skirmish line formed by the 8th Indiana, the Union seven-shot Spencer carbines quickly turned them back. They broke and ran.

At the ford site, the normally placid river was a raging torrent that could only be crossed carefully. When the 5th Iowa attempted a crossing, they were suddenly met by a hail of fire from the 8th Alabama troopers. Except for a few casualties, the Union troops turned and scrambled for cover. Rousseau then sent the remainder of the 8th Indiana to the ferry site to cross and join the rest of the regiment. Meanwhile, Rebel fire at the ford
slackened as the 8th Alabama, its right flank now threatened, withdrew. Mounting their horse, the 4th Tennessee pushed across the river and were able to capture a few retreating Rebels. Within two hours, Rousseau’s entire force was across.

Early that afternoon, the 5th Iowa led the column south along the east bank of the Coosa. Five miles south, they came to Cane Creek Furnace, which had been sending pig iron to Selma. Within minutes, the furnace and outlying building were engulfed in flame. Rousseau’s column continued to move south, sending small detachments out to burn cotton stored nearby. It was sundown when Rousseau called a halt after fifteen miles. In order to move his weary column faster and make up time lost at the Coosa, one gun was destroyed and abandoned, the horses double-teamed on the remaining one. At 10:00 PM, the column was on the move again. At about 2:00 AM at Eastaboga, Rousseau gave the order to dismount. The exhausted troopers slid to the ground, looped their reins around their arms, and were soon asleep.

At 4:30 A.M. July 15, with only two hours’ sleep and no breakfast, the column was on the move south again. With the 8th Indiana leading, the column swept into the town of Talladega, the largest town they had encountered since leaving Decatur.

The Confederates had not been idle. General Clanton had moved the remnants of his command to Blue Mountain, anticipating that Rousseau would be marching east. At Talladega, a supply depot of considerable size, Major Walthall, the post commander, had been unsuccessful in rallying many volunteers to join Clanton or protect the depot. He used the men available to remove as many supplies as possible and then withdrew west. Thus, except for three furloughed Rebel cavalrymen who fired a few rounds into the approaching Union troops, Rousseau met no opposition.

Rousseau posted guards to protect civilian homes, but his hungry troopers made short work of cleaning out smoke houses and bringing armloads of corn and grain from barns for their horses. Stripping the military supply buildings of whatever supplies the command needed, the buildings were soon put to the torch. The troopers destroyed a water tank and damaged railroad switching equipment, but the short rail line to Blue Mountain was of little strategic value. Machinery in two factories was wrecked. In general, anything likely to be of use to the Confederacy was destroyed. About 10:00 AM, the column was on the move again. Three miles south of Talladega, Rousseau called a rest halt, but had the troops on the road again at 4:00 PM.

Rousseau finally stopped the column for the night, having traveled 39 miles since leaving Eastaboga, but at 4:00 AM the weary troopers were on their way again. During this part of the march, detachments were sent out to gather horses and mules as remounts.

That night the force faced its most difficult task: crossing the Tallapoosa River. It was early morning before the entire column had crossed, most fording the river while pack mules, ambulances, and artillery were crossed on a ferry downstream. Once across the river, Rousseau had no other natural obstacle to traverse before reaching his objective: the Montgomery & West Point Railroad. Tired and hungry, they reached the railroad at Loachapoka the evening of July 16. After 240 miles, his command was astride the major rail artery supplying the Confederate army in Atlanta. Rousseau put his troops to work destroying the railroad, spacing detachments both east and west.

Meanwhile, there was panic in Montgomery, where Rousseau’s intentions were still unknown. Perhaps he was headed for Montgomery. Volunteers were first requested and then fit men conscripted, and even students mobilized. Once the threat subsided when no advance west was forthcoming, a force of these amateurs was formed and loaded on a train to attack the invaders to the east. At Cheehaw, they were met by a security force from the 8th Iowa, covering the destruction efforts of the regiment. Once battle was joined, the outnumbered Union cavalrmen called for reinforcements to battle the 1,200 – 1,500 Confederates they reportedly faced. Rousseau dispatched six companies of the 8th Indiana to help them. With the Confederates being forced back, Rousseau saw this effort as diverting him from his primary task and withdrew from the battle.

Meanwhile, General Clanton had left Blue Mountain and followed Rousseau’s path, finally contacting his rear guard and capturing four Union troopers. Shortly thereafter, though, Clanton’s small force was charged by Union troops returning from Cheehaw and scattered.
To the east of Loachapoka, Colonel Hamilton’s brigade was destroying the railroad, with half the men working and the other half on guard. By 11:00 AM, they had destroyed three miles of track and were approaching Auburn. Assembling and mounting his entire command, Hamilton ordered a charge into the town. There was no resistance and Hamilton put half his troops back to work while the other half stood guard or took possession of the Confederate warehouse. After the soldiers had taken what they could use, citizens were invited to take what they wanted.

In twenty-six hours, Rousseau’s troops had destroyed nineteen miles of railroad and telegraph lines, burned every water tank, depot, and government warehouse between Auburn and Notasugla. There were reports of Confederate forces from West Point, Georgia, approaching. It was time to go home. Rousing the men at 4:00 AM on July 19, the Union commander started eastward. He divided his force into three detachments, one part to continue destroying the railroad toward Opelika, one to guard the flanks and rear of the first, and the third to strike the Columbus Branch Railroad two mile below Opelika and work northward and to destroy the switching yards and depots in the direction of West Point. Those missions accomplished, Rousseau assembled his command, and sent a detachment from each unit to bring back supplies from the extensive Confederate supplies in Opelika. After the citizens had had a chance to supply themselves from the stores, as well, the buildings and remaining supplies were burned. About 1:00 PM, the column started northeast on a road paralleling the railroad.

Rumors reached Rousseau that a large force of up to 5,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery was gathering at West Point. The rumors were not far from the truth. Major General George Stoneman’s cavalry raid toward West Point from the north had turned back, but not before Confederate troops had been dispatched to protect West Point. Now they turned to face a new threat from the south.

Rousseau avoided West Point, now more interested in getting his command safely to Union lines at Marietta, Georgia. He bypassed West Point ten to twenty miles to the west and north. For the next three days, Rousseau drove his troopers hard, hoping to get ahead of any reports of his coming. Horses dropped dead and men were exhausted, but on July 22, lead riders made contact east of Powder Springs with a platoon of Stoneman’s 14th Illinois Cavalry., the first friendly faces they had seen in fourteen days.

By 8:00 PM, the last of the column had plodded into the outskirts of Marietta. They were worn out with long hours in the saddle and lack of sleep. The horses were in even worse shape.

But the mission had been accomplished. They had destroyed $20,000,000 to $25,000,000 worth of Rebel property, including 26 miles of railroad and telegraph lines, thirteen depots and warehouses, two gun factories, an iron works, over 1,000 bales of cotton, and huge quantities of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies. They had killed at least 25 Confederates, wounded about 100, and captured 61. These prisoners had been paroled, along with 243 others captured at military hospitals. The raiders’ own losses were minimal: four killed, eight severely wounded, and 35 taken prisoner.

Rousseau reported in person to Sherman, who said to him, “That’s well done, Rousseau, well done. I expected you to tear up the road, but I thought they would gobble you up.”

"My job is to turn the commander's intent into action and execution."

Trooper Bob Witt
Aide to General DePuy
Notes on the Use of Cavalry in the American Revolution

by

Frederic Gilbert Bauer

Parts I-III
Reprinted from the Cavalry Journal, March/April 1938

Note: This article has been abridged.

I

During the first two years of the war the Americans had little or no cavalry and were forced to improvise substitutes, whereas the British apparently did not know how to use the cavalry they had.

The Siege of Boston was stabilized warfare on terrain which afforded no opportunity to use mounted troops, but as soon as the American army moved to New York, its need of these was at once apparent. At first the only substitute the Americans had was to organize such officers as owned horses into patrols too small to have any fighting power and, therefore, useful only for observation. Such a patrol, sent to the Jamaica Pass before the Battle of Long Island, was captured, leaving the American army without any reconnoitering detachment on its left flank. Had there been some efficient cavalry there, timely warning of the turning movements by way of Jamaica could have been given and a delaying action fought. The British on the other hand, in spite of heavy horse casualties on the voyage, had a considerable body of dragoons on the island, and, had they used them to advantage, it is doubtful if Washington could have made his famous night retreat to Manhattan.

To take the place of the cavalry he did not have, Washington organized the "Congress’ Own Rangers," a battalion of light infantry, commanded by Lieut. Col. Thomas Knowlton and composed of the flower of the army, Capt. Nathan Hale being one of the company commanders. When Washington wanted someone to go as a spy within the British lines, he naturally turned to this organization, knowing that in it he would find someone able and willing to undertake the dangerous and important task.

The most conspicuous instance of the British failure to use cavalry is furnished by the New Jersey campaign of November and December, 1776. Washington, with a force of barely 3,000, most of whose enlistments would expire in a month, was retreating before a British force of 12,000, at an average rate of less than five miles per day. So hopeless did the American cause seem that Washington wrote to his brother: "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up." Cornwallis had the better part of a regiment of dragoons, whereas Washington until December 2, when the Philadelphia troop of light horse joined him, had no cavalry except a few of Col. Sheldon’s Connecticut dragoons¹. So closely was Washington pressed that the enemy entered one side of Newark as the Americans left the other, and when the army crossed the Delaware into Pennsylvania, the British reached the East bank of the river before the Philadelphia troop, who were acting as rear guard, had reached the other shore. In spite of the fact that the work which this troop accomplished on that campaign seems little short of a miracle for a command numbering only twenty-five, there can be little doubt that if Cornwallis had used his numerically superior dragoons to attack the flanks and rear of the retreating Americans, Washington’s army could never have escaped across the river. As the British historian Stedman says: "It looked as if Howe had calculated with the greatest accuracy the exact time necessary for his enemy to make his

¹ A New York newspaper of July 11, 1776, thus describes them: "Some of these worthy soldiers assisted in their present uniforms at the first reduction of Louisburg, and their lank, lean cheeks, and war worn coats, are viewed with more veneration than if they were glittering nabobs from India, or Bashaws with nine tails."
escape."

So, too when the British and Hessian troops were dispersed in winter billets along the Delaware, if the cavalry had been used to patrol the roads leading from the ferries, Washington could never have made his surprise attack on Trenton, and there can be little doubt that the Revolution would have collapsed. The Trenton garrison included 20 dragoons of the 16th British regiment, a small number, yet enough to have covered the "river road" leading into Trenton from the North, particularly when there were also available 50 German Jägers to perform the near-by reconnaissance. Instead the Jäger were posted as an ordinary infantry picket on half mile out of town and the dragoons appear to have done nothing but send a patrol each morning to Yardley’s Ferry, five miles to the North.

The Bennington raid in August, 1777, was another instance of the misuse of troops. It was emphatically a case for a swiftly moving force who could strike a sudden blow and make off with their plunder before the countryside could rally. In justice to Burgoyne it must be said that he was apparently so short of horses that he could not send a sufficient body of cavalry. Instead, however, of sending the next thing to it, his light infantry companies and German Jäger, he sent largely dismounted dragoons, wearing high boots, heavy leather caps and sabers. In the rain which turned the roads into mud these men, encumbered with this heavy outfit, were at a distinct disadvantage against Stark’s farmers, many of whom were no doubt in their shirt sleeves, with no impedimenta except a rifle and cartridge box².

² Since the foregoing paper was written, an article by Reginald Hargreaves entitled "Cavalry in the American War of Independence" has appeared in the October, 1937 number of the British Cavalry Journal. It is defective in its treatment of the American side of the subject for the precise reason which led me to write the foregoing article, namely, the lack of detailed information in available form.

On the British side, he obviously has fuller sources of information than were available to me, and for Americans his article forms for this reason a valuable supplement to mine. On certain points effecting the British side, I must, however, disagree with him, e.g.:

1. Though he gives a long list of British and German cavalry organizations, which came to America, he overlooks the fact that the horse casualties at sea were so great that most of these arrived dismounted and served as foot troops, for, in spite of the fact that Tories were numerous among the horse owning class and even so-called "patriots" often preferred to sell for British gold rather than for continental paper, the British seem to have little success in procuring horses locally. Indeed, Lieut. Col. Lee expressly mentions the inferior character of the British mounts.

2. He regards the German Jäger or chasseurs, as he calls them as mounted troops. The few organizations of mounted Jäger (Jäger zu Pferde) date only to the late nineteenth century, and not only is there no evidence of any such mounted troops having come to America, but there is, so far as I can ascertain, no evidence of their existence at the time of our Revolution. The Jäger were expert marksmen, mainly recruited from the huntsmen of the royal forests, and were armed with rifles instead of smooth bore muskets. They were specially skilled in reconnaissance and corresponded to the British Light Infantry companies or to Knowlton's Rangers, referred to above.
Philadelphia in October, 1779, and to quell a mutiny in the army at Princeton in January, 1781.

Its most distinguished service, however, was in the New Jersey campaign of 1776-7. Reporting to Washington at Trenton on December 2, 1776, as above stated, it acted as covering force while the army was being transferred to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware River, furnished Washington’s headquarters guard and couriers, and formed part of the left column in the memorable march to Trenton on Christmas night. On December 30 a patrol of twelve under Col. Joseph Reed, Washington’s Adjutant General, reconnoitered the British at Princeton and captured twelve out of a party of thirteen British dragoons. On New Year’s day it patrolled the Sand Town road, over which the army later made its midnight march to Princeton. After the Battle of Princeton it protected Moulder’s battery, which was covering the withdrawal of the American army, beating off an attack by British dragoons and enabling the battery to bring off all its guns. It seems incredible that a command numbering only 3 officers and 22 men could have accomplished what this troop did in the face of so great odds, but the facts are amply attested. In his order relieving the troop after its two months’ service Washington said: “Tho’ composed of Gentlemen of Fortune, they have shewn a noble Example of discipline and subordination, and in several actions have shewn a Spirit of Bravery which will ever do Honor to them and will ever be gratefully remembered by me.”

The troop with 20 men was again on duty under Washington in September and October, 1777, participating in the Battles of Brandywine and Germantown. It was also with Lafayette in the Barren Hill engagement of May 18, 1778.

III

In a paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society in May, 1910, (Proceedings, Vol. XLIII, pp. 547-593, later revised in Studies Military and Diplomatic, pp. 59-113) Gen. Charles Francis Adams discusses why more use was not made of cavalry in the early years of the Revolution and argues that it was because Washington did not understand the function of cavalry in an army or know how to use it. In support of this contention he compares the use of cavalry by the South in 1861-5 and says that a like opportunity and similar resources were open to Washington, because the situation was one where irregular cavalry operations were the readiest way to cripple the British. “It was a region full of horses, while every Virginian and nearly every inhabitant of Pennsylvania and the Jerseys was accustomed to the saddle. Then, as later in the Confederacy during our War of Secession, people owned their mounts. Every farming lad and every son of a farmer was, in a rude way, an equestrian;…in fact the whole social and business life of the community was in a more or less direct way connected with the saddle and the pillion.” He cites several instances where cavalry could have been used with telling effect and stresses the incident when in July, 1776, Washington declined the services of Col. Seymour’s regiment of Connecticut cavalry on the ground that the terrain about New York afforded no opportunity to use mounted troops and that he had neither forage nor means to buy it, but offered to use the regiment as infantry. The letters from Col. Seymour and Gen. Wadsworth to Gov. Trumbull of Connecticut are printed in full in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, so we can judge the incident upon the same evidence which Gen. Adams used.

Gen. Adams had been a cavalry officer in the Army of the Potomac and knew from personal observation how cavalry could be used, so his views are entitled to weight, but in my opinion he distorts the picture by a false perspective. Cavalry in colonial America was more of a social than a military institution, occupying much the position of the equites equo privato in ancient Rome. The few cavalry troops were volunteer organizations, where members furnished their own mounts and were exempt from service in the territorial militia companies. The only colonial war in which cavalry could have been used normally was Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia. In the ordinary backwoods fighting, Gen. Adams admits, the horse, except as a means of transportation, was a positive incumbrance. Our ancestors learned by sad experience that successfully to fight Indians they must use Indian tactics and move under cover. A trooper crashing through the forest not only gave the lurking redskins warning of his approach, but furnished a better target. Our ancestors were no fools and long before the Revolution they knew that the chances of cavalry being called out to
serve against the French and Indians was negligible. This fact tended to draw into the cavalry troops men of wealth and social position who felt above performing the ordinary duties of a soldier and perhaps had little stomach for the hardships of field service. Col. Seymour’s regiment, as his own letters admit, rushed into the field without even blankets and refused to do their turn of fatigue on the ground that the law of Connecticut exempted cavalry from it. Washington’s commendation of the Philadelphia troop shows how noteworthy it was that “gentlemen of fortune” should show “a noble example of discipline and subordination,” and the exhortation of Congress, quoted later, to form cavalry troops is addressed to “young gentlemen of property.” In other words, cavalry service was still regarded as a rich man’s game.

Furthermore, horses were not so common, in the Northern colonies at least, as Gen. Adams supposes. The poorer classes travelled on foot, even for long distances, and oxen were used on many farms for draft. It is surprising how many inventories of decedents’ estates include no horses. Even if “the whole social and business life…was…connected with the saddle and pillion,” it does not indicate a natural aptitude for cavalry service. The type of horse and the type of horsemanship required for a farmer and his wife to ride to church or market at a walk or jog trot on saddle and pillion differed materially from that required in cavalry work. Indeed, the bulk of people in the Northern and Middle colonies appear to have regarded the horse only as a means of locomotion, and many of the leisure class, who alone had the time and means to cultivate advanced equitation, were Tories. Again, the infantryman, particularly from the more sparsely settled regions, went to battle with the same, or at least the same type firelock which he had used from boyhood to shoot game, so that he was thoroughly at home with it, whereas the cavalryman had no need in civil life to learn the use of the horse pistol, the sword, the lance, or even the musketeron or carbine.

That Washington knew little of the technique of using mounted troops is quite probable, for, as pointed out above, the colonial wars had given him no opportunity to learn it, but the same is true of artillery, for there were few Louisburgs and Ticonderogas, and the campaigns in which he had served had afforded no field for the normal use of that arm. Yet he knew enough of artillery to call on Henry Knox, then little more than a book soldier, to command and train that arm and throughout the war he used his Chief of Artillery in thoroughly modern fashion. As he was himself an expert equestrian and a breeder of horses, it is fair to assume that he had the same general knowledge of cavalry that he had of artillery. In my opinion, his forming patrols of mounted officers and organizing Knowlton’s Rangers to do what was really cavalry work shows that he did understand the function of cavalry, rather than the reverse, but did not know where to get efficient cavalry and so improvised a substitute. In other words, he realized the worthlessness of the equites equo privato which the colonial militia system had produced.

Last but not least, the Revolution produced no one to whom Washington could commit the training and chief command of the cavalry with the same confidence he felt in handing over the artillery to Knox. The entire war did not produce a Cromwell, a Stuart or a Sheridan. The cavalry had no head until the arrival of Count Pulaski, and he, in spite of his great abilities, did not adapt his military knowledge to American conditions as readily as did von Steuben, and was handicapped by the jealousy felt toward him as a foreigner and by his scanty knowledge of English. The four cavalry officers next in rank to Gen. Pulaski, Colrs. Bland, Sheldon, Baylor and Moylan, did not rise above mediocrity, and despair of getting a real cavalry commander is shown by the vote of Congress, November 24, 1778, authorizing Washington to detail an infantry officer to be chief of cavalry. The real cavalry leaders whom the Revolution developed, “Light Horse Harry” Lee, and William Washington, did not rise above subordinate positions, and, brilliant as was their ability in command of small bodies of horse which they led personally, there is no proof that they would have been equally efficient in chief command, where they would have had to depend on subordinates for the actual troop leadership.

In short, Washington’s failure to use cavalry was, in my opinion, due quite as much to lack of good cavalry material and a competent cavalry commander as to his own lack of cavalry experience and lack of appreciation of the part mounted troops play in the war machine.
On June 1st, 1968 an irreplaceable piece of the Cavalry was laid to rest at Fort Riley, Chief. Chief was the last Cavalry horse that was owned by the government. He was a bay gelding that was born in 1932 and was purchased eight years later by the Army from L.A. Parker for $163. Chief then made the trip from his home in Nebraska to Fort Riley, Kansas where he would spend the rest of his life.

In 1941, Chief was assigned first to the 10th Cavalry and then shortly after moved to the 9th Cavalry. By June of 1942 Chief was reassigned again, this time to the Cavalry School at Fort Riley.

In December of 1949, Chief had been retired from service and one month later any horse that was under 16 years old was sold. All of the horses over 17 years old had been put into semi-retirement. All of the horses that were placed into semi-retirement were then transferred to the Fort Riley Veterinary Section in 1953. The photo to the left shows Chief in his retirement years.

Chief was said to be the kind of horse that any trooper would want. “During his active duty years Chief is reported to have been just a good all-round Cavalry Horse. His most
outstanding trait was jumping but he never entered the competitive arena. He was a horse that anyone could ride and because of this trait was a popular horse.”

During his retirement at Fort Riley, Chief became one of the sights to see. During the year Chief would draw several hundred visitors every year. A short description shows just how much Chief enjoyed the visitors, “when the cameras of visitors appear Chief, who was somewhat of a “ham” pricks up his ears and becomes very interested in the click of the shutters.”

Over the years the number of retired horses slowly decreased from 43 in 1953 to just 5 in 1955, then not long after Chief became the last remaining Cavalry horse. He lived a long and happy life until his death in 1968 at the age of 36. A memorial was held for Chief that was attended by General John K. Waters, Lieutenant General Charles G. Dodge, troopers from the 9th and 10th Cavalry and many others to remember Chief. The service was held next to his final resting spot next to the “Old Trooper” monument. The memorial lasted about half an hour, but was a true send off to one of the Cavalry’s own. The memorial ended with the unveiling of a plaque and the band playing traditional Cavalry tunes.

The photographs on this page show the ceremony (above) and the plaque (left) that is on the site of Chief’s final resting place.

1 "Chief—Last Remaining Government Owned Cavalry Horse." 1966.
2 Ibid.
Avon, CT to Arivaca, Arizona: Back to the Border with the Governor's Horse Guards
by Howard Miller

When the members of the First Company Governor’s Horse Guards voted in 1911 to apply for membership in the Connecticut National Guard they could not have foreseen that five years later they would be loading their horses and equipment for a long train journey to the Mexican border. Following raids by the Mexican revolutionary Francisco Pancho Villa, National Guard troops from several states, including Connecticut, had been Federalized and were ordered to the border by President Woodrow Wilson to protect American interests in the area. And so, re-designated Troop B 5th Militia Cavalry in June, and without six months of training at Camp Niantic as anticipated, the cavalymen from Connecticut found themselves in Nogales, Arizona, under the command of Brigadier General Edward H. Plummer, pitching their tents at Camp Steven Little, then referred to as Cemetery Hill.

On July 31 General Plummer’s staff visited the Troop and reported back to the General that the Troop, “in the manner of health and sanitation was the best outfit in Nogales. The General immediately issued a bulletin with such a finding thereon, and ordered it read four times to every one of the 10,000 men in Nogales.” As recognition “for being properly equipped with ‘healthy men, healthy horses, and able officers,’” the General ordered the Troop to “evacuate without delay, and to take possession of a strategically important, unknown hamlet amid the mountains to the westward.”

On August ninth the Troop rode out of Nogales to establish a forward camp in the tiny village of Arivaca, some fifty-two miles to the northwest. First Lieutenant Clifford Cheney described the new camp in a letter home: “We have arrived all safe and sound in our new station. We found a beautiful spot that had been selected for us to garrison….Arivaca is a little village of adobe houses and one store. There are several big ranches in the neighborhood and several big mines within a dozen miles A river

"A view of the camp site of Troop B in Arivaca" (Credit: Bonner Family)
and rode beautiful ponies. They carried rifles...As the Troop passed, Lieutenant Hughes and detachment remained behind just around from the Mexican soldiers, until the main column was a safe distance away, and then followed as a rear guard... We passed through the California Gulch mine and the miners were glad to see us. At Montana we saw a sign stating that $150,000 in gold had been taken from one lode...We got home just ahead of a thunder storm which flooded our little creek into a river which we could not have forded if we had been an hour later.”

On October 8, the Troop received orders to leave Arivaca and return to Hartford. When they arrived home on October 22, only one man was absent: Private Thomas Carter, who had succumbed to blood poisoning at the base hospital in Nogales.

Origins and Fortunes of Troop B was published in 1921 describing the campaign through participants’ colorful accounts, official documents and numerous photographs.

The story of the troop’s service on the border has always been a seminal part of the history and traditions of the First Company Governor’s Horse Guards, and in January 2011 three members made an expedition to retrace
and explore the areas and landmarks described in Origins and Fortunes of Troop B. Meeting in Tucson, Arizona, on the morning of January 15, Captain Leonard Tolisano of Avon, former Sergeant Howard Miller of Cheshire, and Corporal John Cantelmo of Simsbury set off on their journey to revisit the “ hoof-printed tracks” of their cavalry forbearers.

Sergeant Miller picks up the narrative: A sixty-minute drive south from Tucson brought us to the outskirts of Arivaca. We encountered a checkpoint manned by the U.S. Border Patrol. Passing through the checkpoint was a desolate road through open grazing land covered by the ubiquitous mesquite trees of the region. Entering the village of Arivaca we stopped to document our arrival with photos at the simple road sign identifying the town. Another hand-made sign nearby loomed more ominous – “No militia please”. We later learned that the sign was in reaction to a recent murder allegedly committed by a self-styled border militia group.

The rugged beauty of this mountainous paradise, complete with roaming cattle and occasional white-tailed deer, almost made us forget that we were in a war zone in the modern battle against illegal immigration and narcotics-smuggling.

We slowly drove through town, observing a few low buildings and a bar, “La Gitana,” where a gathering of leather-jacketed motorcycle club members returned our stares.

We searched for the couple who were to had ridden.

Outfitted in contemporary Horse Guard uniform, we then went outside to visit the cow pasture that Troop B had used as its campground, commemorating the event with numerous photographs. Finally, we ceremoniously dropped some horse manure that had been contributed by “Mr. Pistol” and “Ducee” at the Horse Guard stable in Avon.

Rob and Mary drove us into town and identified some of the buildings recognizable in the 1916 photographs, including an old Arivaca Hotel, where the Troop B officers had dined, and an adobe ruin. We posed for photographs on the site of a 1916 troop inspection. We also explored the town cemetery and chatted with local residents who seemed intrigued by our historical trek into past.

In Rob’s rugged pickup truck, we drove past Arivaca Creek and followed the dirt road towards California Gulch. We passed an imposing tower and electronic array that Rob identified as part of the government’s “virtual fence” established to help stem the flow of illegal immigrants and drugs. It became obvious to us that the main effort of the U.S. government consists of Border Patrol agents who seemingly randomly roam the back roads in Suburbans, atv’s and on horseback. We got a first hand appreciation of the rugged terrain and tried to imagine the strenuous demands placed on Troop B and their horses. Remains of gold, silver, lead copper and tungsten mines dotted the hillsides.
Viewed from a rocky outcropping on the back road to Nogales, the abandoned mining town of Ruby looms ghostly and distant across picturesque pine-covered hills and deep gullies in this border region of southern Arizona.

We passed the original Noon ranch established by Mary’s family in 1879 and still owned by family members. At the base of the mountainous Cerro Colorado we saw the site of a mining enterprise once owned by Hartford’s Samuel Colt.

In a strange, almost surreal landscape we passed locals out picnicking, miners working small claims and the ever-present Border Patrol haphazardly zooming up and down the dirt roads; At one point we witnessed the apprehension of some suspected illegals.

Although violence in not unknown in the area, I had to admire the stoic calm and resignation of Rob and Mary as we navigated the back roads and gullies. We retraced the back road from Nogales our troop had followed on its route to Arivaca, and gathered some ore samples as souvenirs. Rob pointed out some barely visible smugglers’ trails currently in use.

As the sun was now lower in the sky, we headed back to Arivaca. After an informal taco dinner at Rob and Mary’s, the five of us drove into town to La Gitana, which the Troop B cavalymen knew as “Carmelita’s.” After meeting some of the local populace, and downing some beer, we serenaded all present with a rendition of the 1916 Troop song, “Drink a Highball” which was received with good humor and cheer.

From there it was on to Nogales. We left the La Gitana with each patron, including the bar tender, wearing a new First Company Governor’s Horse Guard ball cap. At the border patrol checkpoint, we made the acquaintance of an officer who was originally from New Britain. Everyone we encountered on the trip seemed interested in our “journey back in time.”

We will remain in contact with Mary who is a writer and historian in addition to her library duties. We look forward to our next visit when we can explore additional sites including Sasabe, Bear Valley, Tres Bellots and the stone blockhouse that was occasionally manned by Mexican soldiers in 1916.

A forty-minute drive put us in Nogales Arizona, a typical modern border town with little historic charm and shabby congested streets.

"Captain Leonard Tolisano and Corporal John Cantelmo of the First Co. Governor's Horse Guards, on the outskirts of Arivaca, AZ" (Credit: H. Miller)

Although the men of troop B never actually entered Mexico in 1916, we decided to invade the Republic to the south on foot the next morning. We didn’t wear uniforms, and the Mexican border guards showed little or no interest in our presence. For two hours we were barraged on the Mexican side with inducements for cheap pharmaceuticals, free Tequila shots and photos sitting on poor bedraggled burros. We purchased a few souvenirs and then attempted a hasty retreat back to U.S. territory. A besieged U.S. border guard questioned me, noticing that my passport expired two years ago. He rolled his eyes and waved us all back onto American soil.

It was an educational and exciting trip. For the first time in almost ninety-five years members of the Connecticut cavalry had returned to the scene of the 1916 campaign and revisited the campground of Arivaca. Although a fascinating area for those that share its history, this is not an idyllic vacation destination. There is a definite tension and unpredictability on the border. But we are hoping to return to Arivaca in the future and possibly procure horses to once again explore the rugged hills and trails of history.

Many thanks to the Bonner Family for allowing use of their photos in this article.
The Sometimes War
by
Herbert M. Hart

An Army of old men and new lieutenants led the Sometimes War that began in 1850. At first, its senior officers had been around since the War of 1812, the rest were fresh from West Point.

Its time span placed the War with Mexico on one end, the Spanish-American War on the other. The Civil War paralleled it for a while in the middle.

It was a fracas fought on a shoe string, sometimes in spite of Congress and public apathy. But it earned twelve campaign streamers for the colors of the United States Army, and settled the Western Frontier.

From 1866 to 1875, it involved more than 200 battles, mostly with the Sioux Indians. Totally, from 1790 to 1898, the subjugation of the American Indian involved 69 campaigns and 19 reasonably definite wars.

The discovery of gold in California brought the Forty-miners. This was the final breaking point for the Indians who had watched trappers, traders, and farmers slowly encroach on their hunting grounds.

In the Pacific Northwest, the Indians refused to settle on reservations. General Harney then opened the area to settlers. In the Plains of the Northwest, a raw lieutenant named Grattan and a drunken interpreter tried to convince the Sioux they should not kill a stray cow. The Grattan force of 30 was killed, and the Sioux took the warpath.

Depending upon semantics involved, wars or expeditions were ordered against the hostile red men, and a semblance of peace returned. Relatively junior officers with names like Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Crook, Pickett, McClellan, Ord, Stuart, Auger, obtained experience that led to generals’ stars in the Civil War.

A tiny, 12,000 man Army fought the first stage of conflict, 1850-62. When rebellion drained the Army of its southern officers and men, and pulled many regular troops to the Eastern fronts, militia volunteers tried to keep the peace.

A massacre in Minnesota, uprisings in Oregon and California, an expedition in Wyoming, the constant threat of secession, and ambushes of the stage lines kept the volunteers busy, though unrecognized.

Even the Confederacy tried to help settle the Indian problem. Its treaty council on the Washita drew 20,000 red men, but then Lee’s surrender left the commissioners without authority and the deliberations were less than academic.

With peace in the East, the vast Army of the Civil War was reduced to almost nothing. It was authorized sixty regiments, but each to consist of ten rather than 24 companies, and each company of 64 men. The private’s pay was cut to $15 a month, less than 1840. Of the 54,000 men authorized, this low pay had attracted only 38,000 by October 1, 1866. And of this number, only 5,000 could be spared for the western frontier.

The area of operations was as large as Europe and numbered more than 300,000 Indians who felt they had first call upon that area. Treaties were tried, only to go up in the smoke of the Bozeman Trail forts. In 1869, President Grant refused to recognize that the Indian tribes had a treaty-making capability, and their status as independent nations ended.

The Indian fighters launched winter campaigns and spring campaigns and summer campaigns. The peace makers trying to end the Modoc War of Northern California were massacred in 1872. Custer’s 1873 Black Hills Expedition discovered gold in the Sioux hunting grounds. The pot was bubbling and in 1876 it spilled over. Campaigns along the Powder River and the Rosebud lead to the high water mark of the Indian Nations: the Battle of the Little Big Horn on July 25, 1876.

This disaster jolted Congress and the public out of its apathy. Everything after this was anti-climactic. The Indians straggled into forts throughout the northwest, and within a year almost all had surrendered. The Nez Perce and Bannocks of Idaho took to the war path, the former to lead the Army on a masterful 2,000 mile chase before they, too, surrendered. In 1890, the last faint hope of the hostile red man
died at the Battle, or Massacre, of Wounded Knee. The surrender of the Brule Sioux on January 30, 1891, closed this chapter in the advancing of the frontier.

This was a saga in which the principal role was played by an undermanned and underpaid Army. It was down to 25,000 men in 1874. Three years later Congress forgot to pay its officers and the War Department had to float loans at banking houses.

But it was an Army that brought peace, and more than peace, to the West. Soldiers at Fort Atkinson, Nebraska, in 1819, spent so much time farming that the Army Inspector suggested they didn’t know how to fight. They proved agriculture could succeed, though, and doubting settlers doubted no longer.

Sawmills were brought by the Army to build its forts, and the lumber industry of the northwest was born. Cattle were driven west to feed the Army, and the great cattle industry was born. Chaplains and schoolteachers were stationed at the forts and ministered to the needs of both military and townspeople, and religion and education helped settle the rawness of the new territory.

Army families were shifted from East to West and back again, and their news of fashion, society, and the happenings along the seaboard retained bonds between the pioneers and the land they had left behind. Amateur theatricals at the forts provided a degree of culture. Mining, mapping, road building, path finding opened a Pandora’s box for which the Army deserves primary credit.

There were hundreds of forts at various places and various times, keeping the peace and advancing the frontier. The presence of the Army’s sheltering arm was the beacon to which settlers came, to plant their crops and plat their towns within the shadows of the military.

Seldom did a town grow without a fort in its vicinity. The Army brought not only peace, but progress, and from such a climate the seeds of the New West took root.

By 1890, the Sometimes War was over. The frontier Army had put itself out of business. The frontier was no more.

From the Library: Photograph of jumping excercises
Don't Miss A Single Issue!
"VOICES OF THE SANDHILLS"
"HIGHWAY 83 - CANADA TO MEXICO"
"TRAILS OF THE WEST"
Subscribe Today and
ENJOY ALL 3 PUBLICATIONS

All 6 issues for only $12.00
(For postage & handling annually)
To Subscribe, send your name
and address along with $12.00 to
SOWDERS RANCH
304 N Cemetery Road • Tryon, NE 69167
308-587-2333

Phone # 308-587-2333

The U.S. Cavalry Association would like to thank Tractor Supply and
manager Brett Perkins for their support.
Cut out the page and send to the U.S. Cavalry Association

THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY ASSOCIATION

JOIN THE CAVALRY!

___Individual dues yearly  - $40.00
___Individual Overseas  - $60.00
___Corporate yearly  - $100.00
___Individual Life  - $400.00
___Family (spouse/children under 18) - $50.00
(Only one vote per family.)
___New member  ___Renewal

Membership year = Jan. 1st to Dec. 31st
$28 = tax deductible. $12 - postage & printing.

Please print:
Name
Address

Telephone ____________________________
Email ____________________________

Visa ___________ Master Card ___________
Card Number __________________________

Cardholder
signature ____________________________
Expires on ____________________________

Sutler’s Store Order Form

Ordered by

Name ________________________________
Address ________________________________
City ____________________________ State ____________ Zip ____________
Phone # ____________________________

Ship To: Only if different from “Ordered by”

Name ________________________________
Address ________________________________
City ____________________________ State ____________ Zip ____________

Payment Method ____________________________
Credit Card # ____________________________
Signature ____________________________
Expiration Date ____________________________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Total Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shipping Charges for Store Items

Make all checks payable to:
United States Cavalry Association or USCA
Mail Payment & Order to:

Merchandise Subtotal
Shipping & Handling
Total

United States Cavalry Association
P.O. Box 2325
Fort Riley, KS 66442-0325
"The Last Charge"
U.S. Cavalry’s Last Charge with the 26th Cavalry...$100.00
This print is 20" x 16"
It is signed by Edwin P. Ramsey
 Comes with a certificate of authenticity
www.edwinpriceramsey.com/

Old Bill Statue... $128.95

Crossed Sabers 2 1/4" Pin...$7.00

Hat Cords...$9.95
Available in yellow, blue, green and red.
U.S. Cavalry Association Polo Shirt...$24.95
Available in Blue or Tan

Cavalry DVDs...$26.95 each.
Choose from:
Horsemanship Volume 1
Horsemanship Volume 2
Horsemanship Volume 3
A Year on a Cavalry Post
Scouting and Patrolling
Here Comes the Cavalry
Pack Transportation

Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander
by Edwin P. Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele
352 pages
$9.95

Army of Two T-Shirt...$17.95