The U.S. Cavalry Part 2
About the Author: W.D. Smithers
Famous Horses and Mules
Sutler's Store Specials

Counterinsurgency on the American Plains: Examining the Army's Pacification of the Plains Indians
History of the MASH and the Lives They Saved
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A full regiment of Cavalry, and the auxiliary units that were attached, was a big outfit. In Comparison with the number of troopers, the non-combatant units were small but their duties were hard, skillful, and they did a big job.

A Cavalry regiment was made up of 12 troops. These were divided into three squadrons. The regiments were numbered and troops were lettered. It is still the same today. A soldier who is now in Korea may be a member of Troop C, 7th Cavalry, just like an old trooper was in 1866. That outfit adopted the name of the Garry Owen Regiment from a song which was one of General George A. Custer’s favorites.

A troop was made up of 65 mounted soldiers who were trained to fight while mounted or as foot soldiers. They were armed with a rifle, automatic pistol, and a saber. Their saddle was the McClellan and a pair of saddle bags. One of the troops was the Headquarters Troop, one a Machine Gun Troop, and one a Service Troop which was made up of pack mules and mule-drawn escort wagons.

The regimental commander usually was a Colonel; the squadron commander, a Lieutenant Colonel or a Major. Troops were commanded by a Captain, generally with a First and Second Lieutenant as his assistants. The authorized non-coms were the First, or Top Sergeant, the Sergeant Major, Stable Sergeant, Mess Sergeants, Supply Sergeant, cooks (3), Corporals, a bugler, saddler, and a horseshoer. In 1916 the pay of the Private was $15 a month; Corporals got $18, so did the cooks, bugler, saddler, and horseshoer. I believe that a Sergeant’s pay was $21 then. The pay was raised in 1917 to $30 for Privates, and when I worked up to a Sergeant in 1918, I got $44.

Besides their military duties, the officers and non-coms did their share of the paper work. The Cavalry was not excused from keeping the records of not only the soldiers, but also the horses and mules. That old saying, “There are two ways to do it, the right way and the Army’s way,” was heard nearly every day in 1915-1916. In a full regiment there were about 1,200 horses.
and mules.

Some of the men of the Signal Corps who were along the border and in Mexico thought that they should have been in the Cavalry as they spent so much time with them. If they had perfected radios in those days, it would have made it much easier for the Signal Corps. The Signal Corps was working on the theory that one day a message could be sent to a troop and a reply received without using telephone wires. The nearest to this idea was that at each of the large border posts they did have a radio station. At each of these places were two towers, about 300 feet high, which were connected by wires to the station building between them. From these they sent radiograms from one to the other.

The Big Bend country was a hard place for the Signal Corps to keep all the outposts hooked up to headquarters. There was one that had 108 miles of telephone line, none less than 50 miles. Whoever designed the poles for those military lines was a good friend of the soldiers who had to put them in. Although they were only about 3 inches in diameter, they served their purpose. Today, more than 40 years since they were put up, there are some of them still in use. After the Army left, the ranchmen and the telephone company took over some of the lines.

Some of the Signal Corpsmen rode horses, and they had two-wheel caisson-type contraptions, carrying spools of wire and the tools that they needed. They also had escort wagons. The rough country did not prevent them from getting there to do the job. The Signal Corps, along with the engineers, the medical, and several others, did not receive the glory and the publicity that the Cavalry, the Artillery, and the Infantry did, but they deserved

"Faithful mules of the Medical Corps are in action here during one of the many field training exercises."

"The Cavalry medics rode horses or in ambulances, as did the vets, being the first in and the last out of camp."
it as their work was hard and often dangerous.

During the Pershing Expedition in Mexico, the Signal Corps did much and was exposed to many dangers, but most people have never heard of the things that it did.

The Carranza government, which was in power and which we had helped before the Columbus raid, so that Villa would not defeat it, would not let us use the telegraph lines or the railroads. A couple of experts from the Signal company would be taken with a small Cavalry patrol to an out-of-the-way place and left there.

When one of the Cavalry squadron commanders operating in that area needed to send a message into headquarters, the Signal Corpsmen would tap the Mexican line and dispatch it to the American Consul at Chihuahua, who would relay it to Pershing.

Also, during the early part of the Pershing Expedition, the Signal Corps had eight airplanes which were used to dispatch messages, make observations, and as some of the forerunners of aerial photography and aerial gunnery. The planes were not much help to the Cavalry, as the odds were too much against them. The planes were worn out before they went there and were not powerful enough to fly in such a high altitude, mountainous region. The failure was not the fault of the flyers as those men risked their lives every time that they went up in those old Curtiss Jenneys. The weather was against them, too, as while they were operating, it was the worst season of the year. You could not tell when one of those sand and wind storms would blow up, but when they did, they blew. A couple of the planes were caught in them, and it was a miracle that the flyers were able to walk back to the camp. We did not lose a single flyer, however.

Also with the Cavalry wherever they went was the Medical Corps. This consisted of not only the doctors and their capable enlisted personnel, but the veterinarians with their enlisted assistants to care for the horses and mules. These men, like those of several other branches of the service, were seldom thought of until they were needed; then you were glad that they were there. On many of those long marches of 25 to 35 miles, the doctors and vets, after riding their horses 8 to 10 hours, often spent several hours just as soon as they made camp, caring for a sick or injured man or horse.

Throughout the long column of troops on a march, at intervals there would be an ambulance with medical officers and enlisted men, mounted as well as in the ambulance, to care for anyone who might need aid, but the main elements would be in the rear columns. When camp was made, what outfit was the first to have their tent up and ready? It was the medical. The medical tents were among the last to be taken down when they broke camp the next day too.

When the Cavalry was in action, the medics followed it and were prepared to go wherever the troopers went. If they could not keep up with them with their mule-drawn ambulances, they also had pack mules which
carried field hospitals. With these, wherever there was a casualty, they were there and ready. All cargoes which pack mules carried were essential and vital, but the mule which carried the two medical field lockers had a cargo that might prove to be what saved a man’s life.

A still more humane service which the medics and the mules gave occurred when a soldier was wounded or hurt too seriously to ride his horse after he had been treated by the doctor; he was then placed on a stretcher which was designed to be fastened between two mules. These mules had been carefully trained for this job.

The Veterinarian Corps, which was a part of the Medical Corps, deserves much more praise than it ever got, except from a few who knew what it did. Without it, the Cavalry could not have been as efficient as it was. No man could have given better or kinder care to his horse than a trooper did, but a Cavalry horse had a tough life to live and, like the men, things sometimes happened to him. When they did, the vets were right there to fix him up, even if it meant working all night for the vet and his enlisted assistants.

All in the Medical Corps wore the insignia called the Caduceus, the staff of Mercury. It consisted of a pair of wings at top with two serpents entwined and, in the center, letters indicating the branch of service, such as M for Medical, N for Nurses, V for the Veterinarians, and other letters for various branches.

The last to team up with the horse Cavalry during the border trouble days was the aviation section of the Signal Corps. This time when they helped out they were better equipped with planes to fly over the rough country and they did a good job. There is no way to know how many raids would have taken place if they had not been flying those patrols. These flights

"Troopers and horses got a good workout in all kinds of rough country, to get there faster and go into action quicker."

"Seldom praised, but always found at intervals in the long columns of troops, were the men of the Medical and Signal Corps."
were started late in 1918, but it was 1919 before they were operating regular flights.

The Cavalry still continued to make constant patrols as it had been doing, but soon realized that the flyers could be of help. The bandits, when they planned to make a raid, had to gather together at some place on the Mexico side as they came from various settlements. They could stay concealed from the Cavalry patrols by the roughness of the region, but to the aviators, a group of 30 or more mounted men could not conceal themselves. When five or more riders on the Mexican side were seen together, the flyers would fly to the nearest Cavalry headquarters or patrol and drop them the message. The bandits soon learned that also. The bandits also learned that each plane had two machine guns and the aviators were ready to use them.

The planes which were used were the DeHavilands that were designed and built for use in France as fighter-bombers. They were two-place, dual control, and mounted with two 30 caliber machine guns, one mounted forward which the front pilot fired between the strokes of the propeller, the other on a revolving turret so that the rear flyer could stand up and get that gun into any position. A group of mounted bandits would have given him some perfect targets.

The bandits moved farther away from the Rio Grande, and there were no more big raids. The only excitement that happened was in August, 1919, when one of the planes mistook the Conchos River for the Rio Grande and, while over Mexico had motor trouble and was forced to land about 40 miles in Mexico. The pilots were unhurt in the landing. They walked to a village where they engaged an old Mexican to take them to the river. They started out riding on burros when they were overtaken by a band of bandits under Jesus Renteria and made prisoners. This bandit had previously lived in the United States and spoke English. He had lost one hand while working in the U.S. and wore a steel hook. Along the border he was known as Gacho (Hook).

When the facts became known that the two U.S. flyers were being held for $15,000 ransom, this part of the border was very tense. It was a front page story in all the newspapers throughout the United States. The incident was followed up by that courageous Cavalry captain’s ride at midnight into Mexico to get the two flyers. The captain made two rides that night, bringing one of the flyers each trip, the flyer riding behind him on the horse. The Cavalry captain only paid the bandit half of the ransom. This was one story which was talked about for a long time along the border.

About the Author:  
W.D. Smithers

Wilfred Dudley Smithers was born on August 31, 1895 in San Luis Potosi, Mexico. At the age of 10 Smithers and his family moved from Mexico to San Antonio, Texas. Smithers took an interest in photography due to an apprenticeship with Charles W. Archer. During this apprenticeship Smithers learned how to take and develop photographs, which would become a defining characteristic of his life.

In 1915 Smithers began working on an Army Mule Train until he decided to enlist in the U.S. Cavalry in 1917. After his enlistment in the Cavalry, he was stationed in Otay Mesa where he soon transferred to the Army Signal Corps to work with the Aviation Section. During his military service Smithers put his talents as a photographer to good use by teaching pilots to use a camera gun so that they could more effectively train in aerial gunnery. Smithers was honorably discharged from the Army on April 7, 1919.

Over the years Smithers maintained his connection to the Southwest, the Army and photography. One of his many accomplishments was inventing a camera that could withstand the air blast from an aircraft’s propeller. He was also a key figure in the establishment of an airfield in the Big Bend area of Texas.

In 1935 the U.S. Immigration Service and Border Patrol asked Smithers to photograph the United States-Mexico border. These photos and those included in this article are just a portion of the many subjects from around the Southwest that were all taken during Smithers’ career. Smithers died in on June 24, 1981 leaving his legacy through the photographs that he took.
Army Mule:

Preston Brand 08K0

The value of the mule in mountainous terrain could not be understated because of their ability to carry supplies where other means could not. One mule in particular saw a great deal of service for all sides of war from World War II to the Korean War. One mule was known by his serial number Preston Brand 08K0, served during World War II in the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater. After the war the mule was then transferred to the Nationalist Chinese. It is assumed that this mule was then captured by the Communist Chinese forces. This would explain how the mule ended up in Korea and captured by U.S. forces. Preston Brand 08K0 proved just how strong an Army mule was.

Famous Horses and Mules

Sgt. Reckless:

One Good Marine

Originally known by the name Flame a chestnut mare with a white stripe was bought for $250 at a race track in Korea in 1952 by the 5th Marines. Flame was renamed Reckless and was trained for ammunition transport. As with the horses that belonged to the cavalry, Reckless needed to undergo strict training. She learned how to load and unload from a trailer, hit the deck when commanded by a tap on the leg and to carry a loaded pack saddle.

Reckless became one of the Marines and was a much loved member who most of the time had free run of the camp. It was said that Reckless would try and eat just about anything there was, including beer, chocolate and according to one story poker chips from a game in progress.

“Reckless had her first chance to prove to her platoon members just how much of a Marine she was when the platoon was next assigned a fire mission

Upon arriving at the site, Sgt. Ralph Sherman and his gun crew started the ascent up the hill with the heavy weapon. Reckless, led by PFC Coleman, eventually overtook them. Sherman and his crew were close behind. Coleman and Reckless dropped off their first load of ammo.

While Coleman and Reckless were on their way back with their second load, Sherman fired the weapon. A loud roar echoed through the hills. Reckless went straight in the air. Even with the six shells she was carrying, she completely left the ground. When she came back down, she was trembling with fright. Coleman tried to soothe Reckless, but Sherman’s weapon fired again. Reckless snorted. Coleman spoke to her again. Again the weapon fired, and again. By this time, Reckless was little fazed. It was time for Sherman and his gun crew to move to another firing position

Reckless and Coleman continued to supply the gun crew with ammo at the various firing positions. By the last firing position, Reckless seemed to be calm. She was looking around for grass to eat. Sgt. Lathom later spied her trying to eat an old helmet liner she’d found."

Reckless proved her mettle in combat when she needed to carry recoilless rifle rounds. She went on several missions where she carried ammunition to the Marines. Reckless was known best for her exploits at Hill Vegas. During the fight Reckless made approximately fifty trips to resupply the Marines. On some of these trips Reckless would be accompanied by the Marines other times she would go alone. During the course of the day Reckless received two wounds, one above her eye and one on her left flank. Even while wounded she was still able to keep supplying the Marines.

After serving through to the end of the war Reckless was able to be shipped stateside where she was honored and given Sergeant Stripes. Sgt. Reckless retired on Nov. 10, 1960 and lived Camp Pendleton until her death on May 13, 1968. Sgt. Reckless’ service in Korea helped to show that horses still had a place in the military, even in the age of modern weapons.

Notes

The American expansion westward began with the establishment of the first colonies on the Atlantic coast and continued on through the granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii. The period from 1860 to 1890, however, was one of the bloodiest in American history and rife with large-scale killings perpetrated by the Plains Indians, American soldiers, and settlers on the Great Plains and western mountains. The bloodshed was largely the result of increased pressure on resources, such as grazing lands and game herds, caused by a large influx of gold seekers following reports of gold strikes in the Black Hills and Rocky Mountains. Pressure was equally applied by settlers, drawn into lands previously reserved for Indian use by the Homestead Act of 1862.

As pressure increased, the native plains dwellers became increasingly combative toward the emigrants and the Army was forced into a longterm program of pacification. This program, which started well before the Civil War, was not managed by a specific doctrinal structure; instead, it developed over time and was influenced by both European and North American wartime experiences.

It should also be noted at the onset that the conflict between the Plains Indians and settlers was rooted in the differing cultures of the two groups. While the results of campaigns and outbreaks of violence were affected by the personalities of the individuals leading them, the larger conflict was essentially societal in nature. John Gray describes the nature of the issue in anthropological terms, “The real differences that rendered the white and red cultures so utterly incompatible were far deeper — so profound as to remain hidden in the subconscious. The red man’s ideal was to exploit nature...from these, bone deep, but opposite poles stemmed a thousand incompatibilities.” These differences manifested themselves in the combat tactics of both groups as well, with the Indians using what would become classic hit-and-run guerrilla warfare techniques and the Americans relying on force-on-force engagements.

For the purposes of this article, the term “insurgency” is used to describe the type of war-
fare enacted by the Plains Indians against both settlers and the U.S. Army. In a similar vein, “...the term counterinsurgency embraces all of the political, economic, social, and military actions taken by a government for the suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements.” While extensive archeological evidence has proven that the Indians inhabited the North American continent long before the European arrival, for the sake of clarity the terms “settler” and “army” will be used collectively to refer to those soldiers and settlers whose ancestry lay outside North America (such as Europe and Africa). Conversely, the term “Plains Indians” will be used to refer collectively to the inhabitants of the Great Plains, Black Hills, and other regions affected by America’s westward expansion.

The Army faced many challenges in conducting campaigns against the Plains Indians, including deficits in troop strengths, training constraints, doctrinal questions, and shortfalls in equipment and supplies. Following the Civil War, Congress mandated a drawdown of the armed forces to prewar levels. For the Army, this represented a maximum allowable strength of approximately 54,000 troops. On the surface, this would appear to be sufficient until one takes into consideration the sheer number of problem sets that those same troops had to confront. As Robert Utley describes it, “...the opening of new areas of settlement and launching of the transcontinental railroad had dramatically enlarged the western needs, now too, reconstruction duties would absorb up to one third of available manpower.” The use of soldiers for peacekeeping duties during the reconstruction era lasted until approximately 1876. By that time, volunteer infantry and cavalry regiments, which had been created to backfill the gaps caused by redeployment of regular forces eastward, were in large part replaced by regular troops, again. In some instances, volunteer forces continued to be used on an ad hoc basis, particularly when local sentiments demanded citizens do their part.

Generally speaking, the training and quality of enlisted soldiers following the Civil War was poor. After an initial indoctrination period, which lasted approximately 2 to 3 weeks, recruits were shipped off to their duty stations where on-the-job training was conducted. For example, “...recruits received only the most basic instruction during their short time at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, the cavalry's recruit depot. Training in marksmanship, horsemanship, and skirmishing — any practical lessons that Indian fighting might involve — was virtually nonexistent. Formal military training of recruits consisted mostly of elementary drill aimed at making a grand appearance at dress parade. After a week or two, at most, of close order drill and fatigue duty, they were sent directly to their units.” This resulted in both lost time and effectiveness at the unit level as these individuals had to be trained in the finer points of real soldiering versus parade ground soldiering.

While some of the post-war recruits, particularly those who were recent immigrants from Europe, came from honest backgrounds, or had wartime experience in either the Civil War or European wars, there were significant disciplinary problems, such as desertion within the ranks, due to the overall quality of enlisted troops. Unlike many Civil War-era soldiers, who enlisted out of patriotism and represented the broad spectrum of both Union and Confederate societies, those who enlisted following the war, generally did so because the Army offered meals, a steady paycheck, and, in some cases, a place to hide. Donovan describes the issue as such: “As mediocre as the soldiers’ training and fighting ability was the caliber of their character.” One general officer said, “The enlisted personnel consisted largely of the dregs from the Union and Confederate armies and of recent immigrants from Europe.” One 7th Cavalry private, at the age of 16, abandoned his six months’ pregnant wife to enlist, claimed that “some of the hardest cases that I ever came across are at present serving in this company.”

Training deficiencies were initially mitigated at the unit level through programs of acclimatization, centered on long marches and rides, to build both stamina and teach field skills. Exercises with experienced scouts acting as aggressors were also frequently used to teach tactical skills such as small unit maneuver and skirmishing techniques. By the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Army managed to revamp its basic training program for new recruits, to include more instruction on common tasks required for service on the frontier. Emphasis on marksmanship was finally stressed as well,
Most of the credit for West Point's emphasis on Jomini can be traced to the influence of Dennis Hart Mahan, who graduated from West Point in 1824 and joined its faculty in 1832. According to Weigley, "Jomini's interpretation of Napoleon became the foundation of teaching strategy at West Point...the cadets encountered his teachings in Dennis Mahan's explication of the art of war in the senior course, which formed the principal introduction to the subject, for Mahan's ideas were formed upon Jomini's."\(^9\)

When target practice finally was given an important role in training, the Army took it up enthusiastically and marksmanship became as much stressed as it had become slighted.\(^7\) The presence of an experienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps within the Army also facilitated a continuity of effort for the Army's campaigns on the Great Plains. The majority of the Army's NCOs were Civil War veterans who had chosen to make the Army a career. They were able to impart critical training in tactics and field craft to newer soldiers who, in many cases, were serving as mentors. As Rickey describes, senior troops were sources of knowledge for all things related to soldiering: "From their conversation, the neophytes soon learned about a wide variety of subjects not included in any book of drill or regulations. ...After spending a year or two in a company, most men seem to have made a satisfactory adjustment...except for those who chose to desert, the majority...served out their enlistments as regular soldiers.\(^8\)

Unlike training for the enlisted men, the quality of training for officers, and overall experience levels, was better; however, more emphasis was placed on the study and refinement of European style tactics than on practical skills for war on the plains. The root of this emphasis on European tactics was the U.S. Military Academy at West Point where the curriculum emphasized the study of Napoleonic tactics and the philosophy of Baron Antoine-Henry de Jomini. Most of the credit for West Point's emphasis on Jomini can be traced to the influence of Dennis Hart Mahan, who graduated from West Point in 1824 and joined its faculty in 1832. According to Weigley, "Jomini's interpretation of Napoleon became the foundation of teaching strategy at West Point...the cadets encountered his teachings in Dennis Mahan's explication of the art of war in the senior course, which formed the principal introduction to the subject, for Mahan's ideas were formed upon Jomini's."\(^9\)

In addition to scholastic emphasis on European warfare, under General Sherman's postwar leadership, the Army also undertook a systematic program of strengthening the service's artillery and engineering programs, as well as infantry and cavalry study programs, based on the European tradition. "He created opportunities for officers to observe foreign armies and report on their practices. Under his patronage, Lt. Col. Emory Upton traveled around the world and set forth his findings in The Armies of Asia and Europe."\(^10\) While useful in a general sense in the professionalization of the Army's officer corps, none of those programs was of help in developing a solution to the Plains Indian problem.

The program at West Point was not entirely without merit, however. Small unit tactics and skirmishing were taught to the officers, as was marksmanship. Some of Mahan's own writings and lectures did address the problem of warfare on the plains from a practical standpoint: "Mahan's Out-Post and Colonel J.B. Wheeler's, A Course of Instruction in the Elements of the Art and Science of War for the Use of the Cadets of the United States Military Academy, endorsed the use of winter operations, night marches, and dawn raids to surprise enemy encampments."\(^11\) Those concepts, along with attacks against villages, became the backbone of the Army's strategy for
Compounding poor-quality troops and improperly educated officers was the issue of inadequate equipment and supplies. The end of the Civil War found the U.S. Army with warehouses full of uniforms and equipment, much of it cheaply made and unsuited to the wear and tear of frontier service. As a result, troops in the field frequently had the appearance of irregular forces, wearing combinations of uniforms and civilian dress or combinations of hats, shirts, trousers, and boots from different uniform series groups. This was the case through the late 1880s, when khaki canvas uniforms were made standard throughout the Army. Rations also followed the same course of distribution as uniforms. Civil War stocks of canned meats were reportedly still in use well into the 1870s. Distance between posts also affected regular resupply efforts and many outlying detachments were forced to supplement meager rations with locally grown vegetables and fresh meat from hunting expeditions. Both were practices that took considerable time and available troops away from security patrols and pacification campaigns.

Weapons, on the other hand, did enjoy regular improvements. Most significantly was the shift from paper to metallic cartridges. Unlike paper, metallic cartridges were sturdy and waterproof, hence more suited to the harsh frontier environment. Breechloading rifles and repeaters also provided a much needed edge against the Indians because they allowed a greater possible rate of fire due to shorter reload time requirements. Against moving targets, such as running Indians, this was a critical factor since Army marksmanship training was primarily focused on shooting at static targets with emphasis on methodical precision.

While the majority of Plains Indian-owned firearms were cheaply made single-shot rifles and shotguns, generally referred to as “trade guns,” some better quality rifles and repeaters made it into their hands. These rifles were likely obtained through capture in battle or via unscrupulous traders. According to Utley, “The improved firearms that suddenly appeared in the hands of the bluecoats at the close of the Civil War took the Indians by surprise. The Sioux, for example, suffered bloody repulses at the Wagon Box and Hayfield fights of 1867 because of the deadly fire.” Also highly effective were the Army’s Hotchkiss guns, which “provided the most popular and effective artillery piece for western service... it could be fired rapidly and accurately at ranges up to 4,000 yards. Above all, it was light and compact enough to be taken almost anywhere on a wheeled carriage.”

The Army also had the advantage over the Plains Indians when it came to transport. Unlike
Unlike Western society, in which warfare was a learned skill, taught to a relatively small percentage of society, conflict was an integral part of the Plains Indian way of life. Because they were essentially nomadic in nature, they required a huge area to support themselves. As a result, when tribes met, it was usually in combat over scarce resources or during raids on each other’s camps to capture slaves or horses. Those instances were governed by an unofficial code of conduct however, which stipulated that combat be conducted fairly. According to Utley, “...many of the western tribes shared certain fundamental characteristics. Whatever their environment, they lived close to it, finely tuned to its vagaries, able to exploit such food and other resources as it contained... They cherished the freedom, independence, and dignity of the individual, the family, and the group. With some notable exceptions, they exalted war and bestowed great prestige on the successful warrior.”

This emphasis on independence and public democracy led to critical miscommunications, especially with respect to treaty validation between the Plains Indians and U.S. Government. Whereas, the soldiers and settlers viewed representatives to the treaty committees as being empowered to sign for all, the Plains Indians viewed the process differently. Generally speaking, they viewed treaties as being valid only for those individuals and their immediate families who signed them. Indeed, “The U.S. government never seemed to understand that the ‘chiefs’ who put pen to paper rarely represented their tribes completely, in the way of traditional white representatives. Indians who did not sign a particular treaty felt no compunction to follow the treaty’s dictates, much as the government expected them to. Since the government needed someone to sign each treaty, in some cases, government representatives anointed a chief if one did not exist... Faulty interpreters also ensured failure. Compounding the U.S. government’s deceitful tactics was the fact that adherence to treaties was arbitrary.”

Indeed, beyond competition for resources from the settlers and the perceived invasion of their territories, the most notable cause of strife was the repeated violations of treaties. “In nearly every case, the pressures from the settlers — their demand for land, for boundaries, for rights of way, for minerals, for buffalo hides — touched off a conflict. The cycle repeated itself endlessly: an advance guard of settlers or soldiers moving into Indian country, usually in violation of a U.S. government-Plains Indian treaty; Indian attacks often including arson, murder, and mutilation; a frantic call for protection and military reprisal; and a brief, bloody war that always, if not sooner than later, ended in an Indian defeat and another long step in the United States advance of the frontier.”

The so-called Plains Indian wars were, in actuality, a long series of incidents and responses, instigated by both sides. Some campaigns were extremely short, while others...
can be characterized as either long or consisted of flare ups of such regularity that they constituted single events. It has already been noted that conflict with the Indians began with the first European landings. However, the tensions between the groups reached an apogee during the 30-year period between approximately 1860 and 1890, during which time there were few periods of relative peace. The list of noteworthy campaigns against the Plains Indians includes:

- The Apache Wars (1861-1886).
- Sioux Uprising in Minnesota (1862).
- Navajo Conflict (1863-1864).
- Plains Wars of the 1860s: Cheyenne-Arapaho War and Sand Creek Massacre (1864-1865); Red Cloud’s War (1866-1867); Hancock’s War (1867); and Cheyenne Winter Campaign (1868-1869).
- The Modoc War (1872-1873).
- The Nez Percé War (1877).
- The Ute War (1879).
- The Sioux Wars: The Black Hills War (1876-1877); and Ghost Dance Campaign (1890-1891). \(^{19}\)

For the most part, the U.S. Army’s campaign strategy evolved into a combination of attacks against villages and withholding promised rations and other supplies to ensure compliance and rendition of warriors to prison facilities in Florida. The main thrust of all the campaigns involved attacks on villages. As a practice, this actually began shortly after initial European contact was made with the native inhabitants of the Americas. The practice was refined by the Union Army during the Civil War as an effort to destroy support for Confederate forces. As a result of the seasonally nomadic lifestyle of the Plains Indians, villages were not permanent, with locations changing with both seasons and movements of animal herds. The temporary structures that made up the villages represented the sum of all of the possessions of a given tribe (sans animals) and destruction usually resulted in the survivors becoming dependent on government largesse for survival. “The [typical] surprise attack on the village was total war. In such encounters, women and children were always present. They mingled with the fighting men, often participating in the fighting, and in the confusion and excitement of battle were difficult to identify as noncombatants. In engagement after engagement, women and children fell victim to Army bullets or were cast upon a hostile country, often in winter, without food or shelter.”\(^{20}\) This policy resulted in public outcry in the eastern part of the United States, as well as across Europe. Charges of genocide were levied against and denied by the Army frequently. Yet that was precisely the unofficial spirit which drove the western campaigns. For many settlers and soldiers, the era of North American Indian society was over and the only acceptable options to offer the Plains Indians were to assimilate or perish. Indeed, some politicians called for outright extermination. One such was Governor John Evans of Colorado. Following an outbreak of violence in 1864, the Governor called for the following: ‘I again appeal to you to

\[\text{\"As the Army began to suffer significant defeats, such as the Fetterman Massacre, allegations of Plains Indians possessing superior firepower in the form of Winchester repeaters began to appear in an effort to excuse poor tactical performance. While the Winchester was a well-designed and popular firearm prevalent throughout the West: \text{\"The number of warriors who boasted such weapons was greatly exaggerated.\"}}\]
organize for the defense of your homes and families against the merciless savage. ...Any man who kills a hostile Indian is a patriot.”

To his credit, the governor did point out the potential for increased violence, if friendly Plains Indians were killed by accident, but closed his proclamation by noting that, “Eastern humanitarians who believe in the superiority of the Indian race will raise a terrible howl over this policy, but it is not time to split hairs nor stand on delicate compunctions of conscience. Self-preservation demands decisive action and the only way to secure it is to fight them in their own way. A few months of active extermination will bring about quiet, and nothing else will.”

Evans’ proclamation was echoed in the U.S. Government’s actions with respect to its observance of many treaties enacted with the Plains Indians. By way of example, one particular treaty, which was made with members of the Oglala Sioux tribe, was first offered with the most unacceptable terms possible such as rights for settlers to trespass at will and confinement of the Oglala to a specific region (a reservation). Following the Oglala’s rejection, the treaty was modified in a Machiavellian manner in which contradictory clauses were deliberately placed into the text so that the government would retain its legal advantages in dealing with them. Gray describes the treaty as, “Here is a solemn treaty that cedes territory admittedly unceded; that confines the Indian to a reservation while allowing him to roam elsewhere; and that guarantees against trespass, unless a trespasser appears! The Indian was given to understand that he retained his full right to live in the old way in a vast unceded territory. ...The treaty does indeed say precisely this. The fact that it also denies it was no fault of the Indian. It was the [Peace] Commission that wrote in the contradictions. There can be only one explanation — they designed one set of provisions to beguile and another to enforce.”

Also, according to Gray, the aforementioned treaty was nullified shortly after President Johnson left office by the Army, wherein General Sherman approved the following policy change for dealing with Indians found outside of reservations: “Outside the well-defined limits of their reservations, they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority, and as a rule will be considered hostile. At that moment, the unceded Indian Territory became white territory, and Indians who continued to roam there were officially labeled ‘hostiles.”

Treaties between the government and Plains Indians during this period always included provisions for the care and management of the Indians and their reservations. This came in the form of designated “Indian agents,” who were responsible for ensuring that food, clothing, tools and stipends were disbursed. Lack of serious oversight into the management of the reservations facilitated a great deal of corruption and malfeasance on the part of the agents. While not frequently raised to the public eye, one such incident resulted in the resignation of President Grant’s secretary of the interior, Columbus Delano, in 1875. More often than not, corruption went unchecked. According to Utley and Washburn, “Few government agencies lent themselves more readily to patronage politics and corruption than the Indian Bureau and none achieved a worse reputation. ...Despite some notable exceptions, most Indian agents were deplorably unqualified.”

As a means of controlling the Plains Indians, the reservation system was without par. By forcing them to become dependent of the government for subsistence, they lost their independence. Indeed, the reservation system has been credited, along with its adjunct village attacks, as destroying both the spirit and means to resist against the combination of settlers and the Army. Utley and Washburn describe the lasting effects of the system thusly: “By the 1880s, the reservation system had, in effect, deprived the Indians of the ability to hunt or make war — the two pastimes that consumed most of their energies and, more important, shaped their social, economic, political, religious and military institutions.”

Those individuals who resisted reservation life faced three choices. The first was to go north to Canada or south to Mexico. Canada however was dealing with its own Plains Indian issues in much the same way as the United States and Mexico only offered more inhospitable deserts to the north and unwelcoming established populations to the south. The other recourses were acceptance or continued fighting. Continued fighting generally had two outcomes, death or rendition.
In an effort to move troublemakers away from potential followers, a policy of rendition was enacted in which particularly dangerous troublemakers who were captured were removed from familiar territory entirely and sent to Florida. The site selected for this early version of Guantanamo Bay was Fort Marion. According to Utley and Washburn, “Early in 1875, the government decided upon a tough new tactic to break the resistance of the Plains Indians. The most dangerous warriors would be sent - without benefit of trial - to Fort Marion, a seventeenth-century Spanish prison in St. Augustine, Florida.”

Village attacks, population of reservations, forced treaties, and rendition were all by-products of military campaigns. Over the course of the 30-year period covered by this article, a distinct pattern emerged in which campaigns were predicated by uprisings which, in turn, were reactions to patrols and campaigns and other American actions. Among the more notable campaigns were the Navajo Conflict, Modoc War, and the series of Sioux Wars. These three conflicts are representative of the overall conflict between Indians and Americans, in that they represent typical campaigns and their outcomes.

While the buildup to the so-named “Navajo Conflict” was typical in nature, in that it resulted from a steady increase in pressure from both sides, the actual campaign was relatively short. Starting in July 1863 and ending in January 1864, the campaign also had the significance of being one of the only major Indian campaigns of the Civil War fought by federal troops. The stated cause of the need for action was a combination of repeated incidents by both soldiers and Plains Indians, including an attack by approximately 1,000 Navajos on Fort Defiance, which led to the Army’s decision to relocate the Navajos. “In April 1863, General James Carleton informed the leading Navajo chiefs of his plans to deport the tribe onto the Bosque Redondo Reservation, along with the Mescalero Apache. Those of the 12,000 Navajo who refused to leave would be treated as hostile.” Like other campaigns, the focus was on attacks on villages with the attendant destruction of crops and livestock to starve the Navajos into submission. Unlike other campaigns, however, the Navajos eventually got their land back because the Bosque Redondo Reservation could not support the combined tribes. “In the spring of 1868, [the Navajo chiefs] were allowed to present their case to President Johnson in Washington, D.C. On 1 June 1868, the tribe won permission to return to its homeland. A new treaty set aside 3.5 million acres of reserved lands.”

By contrast to the Navajo experience, the Modoc War resulted not only in the complete removal of the Modocs from their traditional home in northern California, but the death of General Canby. General Canby was shot in the face by Kintpuash, the Modoc chief, during surrender negotiations, “When Kintpuash could not get Canby to promise to remove all the soldiers and allow the Modoc to remain in California, he drew a pistol and shot Canby in the face then stabbed him. (Edward R.S. Canby thus became the only U.S. general killed in the country’s Indian wars.).” When captured, ...
Kintpuash was hanged and General William T. Sherman ordered the surviving Modocs to be deported east “so that the name of Modoc shall cease.” The Army escorted the 155 surviving Modoc to no homes in Indian Territory. Their brief rebellion turned out to be the last Indian conflict in the California-Oregon border region.”

The Modoc campaign was fought primarily against groups of Indians in fortified mountain caves and redoubts instead of against villages. During campaigns of this nature, lightweight cannons, such as Hotchkiss guns, were particularly effective weapons.

The first significant event in the conflict was during 1862 in Minnesota. The uprising was purely the result of frustration. A small group of Santee Sioux, hungry and frustrated at not being able to find game, and angry at intrusions by missionaries and diversion of promised annuities into the pockets of unscrupulous government representatives, vented their anger by killing five settlers. This, in turn, galvanized the tribe into continued action and, “In a week of bloody horror, fully eight hundred settlers died violently in atonement for the wrongs done to the Santee, and but for the successful defense of Fort Ridgley and New Ulm, many more might have perished.” Following a largely successful counteroffensive by the Army, some 20 to 30 Santee warriors were hanged, but the chief instigators were able to flee to the relative safety of the Black Hills where they linked up with other groups of Sioux and continued to aggress against settlers and soldiers.

The Black Hills were the locations for
arguably the two most well-known battles of the Indian Wars. The first was Custer’s battle at Little Bighorn Creek, and the second at Wounded Knee Creek. The root cause for so much conflict occurring in the Black Hills can be summed up in one word — “gold.” As early as 1874, the Army began sending reconnaissance patrols into the Black Hills as a cover for surveyors and prospectors, likely in an effort to inject cash into the country’s economy following the post-Civil War recession that peaked the year before. As Donovan describes it, “…by early August, the nation’s newspapers were headlining sensational reports that the Hills had proved to be a veritable paradise with ‘gold in the grass roots.’ If there is any purpose a financial depression can serve well, it is to escalate rumors of a gold strike into a full blown rush.”

The gold rush in the Black Hills put the U.S. Government in a difficult position. It was obligated to uphold its treaties with the Sioux, protecting them against trespass, yet it also had to protect its citizens from the angered Plains Indians and reinvigorate its economy. By undertaking a calculated policy of no action against the miners, which incited the Sioux into rebellion, the Government was able to take steps to lay claim to the Black Hills. Among these steps was a campaign to attack villages in the vicinity of Little Bighorn Creek, which was, from the Army’s perspective, tragically unsuccessful. Instead of destroying villages and subjugating the Sioux, nearly all of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was exterminated by unforeseen numbers of very angry Plains Indians. This loss resulted in both an appropriations bill to increase the size of the Army’s tactical footprint on the plains by nearly 2,500 troops and renewed calls to bring an end to the Plains Indian problem once and for all. The solution came in the form of a year-long series of campaigns, which began in 1876, and resulted in the majority of the Sioux becoming ostensibly pacified and, for the most part, living on reservations.

As was typical of the time, the Sioux reservations were mismanaged and starvation began to occur. Unlike past instances, however, instead of groups leaving reservations and going on the warpath again, a new factor developed, a religious movement called the ‘Ghost Dance.’ The Ghost Dance movement was first and foremost a form of religious empowerment that provided to its adherents a belief that, among other things, they could not be killed by the soldiers. As word about the new religion percolated through the Army and government, senior leadership moved quickly to put a stop to it. Messages, such as that from Indian agent Daniel Royer, were wired to Washington stating, “Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy. ...We need protection and we need it now,” only served to speed the deployment of troops. The conflict culminated in a battle at Wounded Knee Creek in December of 1890, which resulted in approximately 200 Indians killed in action. While there were some very small mopping-up actions throughout January of the following year, such as the surrender of the last of the movement’s leaders, Kicking Bear, on the 15th, Wounded Knee is largely regarded as

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“The conflict culminated in a battle at Wounded Knee Creek in December of 1890, which resulted in approximately 200 Indians killed in action. While there were some very small mopping-up actions throughout January of the following year, such as the surrender of the last of the movement’s leaders, Kicking Bear, on the 15th, Wounded Knee is largely regarded as the final battle of the Indian Wars.”

The final battle of the Indian Wars. Victory on the battlefield was largely the result of “...four fast firing Hotchkiss guns [which] opened up, and in less than an hour, two thirds of [the Sioux present] had been wiped out.”

The focus of the Army’s counterinsurgency programs was not to keep Indian activity from affecting American territory, it was to pacify and force Indians into living in controlled environments of the reservations. While designed to provide sustenance by supplementing farming with both food allotments and stipends, the corruption endemic to the reservation system inspired many Indian tribes to embark on insurgencies as reactions to government control. The methods that they employed were in effect guerrilla warfare tactics, such as ambushes and swift strikes against soft targets like patrols and settlements. The initial Army responses were poor ones and only over time were effective measures developed. Because a lack of formal doctrine to deal with rebellions existed up to the 1920s, tactics, such as village attacks, came out of the wartime experiences of Civil War veterans and the employment of European-style small-unit tactics taught at West Point. As Birtle describes it, “...while the Army had never developed a formal doctrine for Indian, it had gradually evolved a theory that blended conventional with unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources upon which Plains Indian power rested.”

About the Author

Anthony Saccavino is currently a worldwide atrocities analyst, Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC. He received a B.A. from University of Massachusetts and an M.A from Norwich University. His military education includes Airborne School, Defense Language Institute (Russian and Spanish), Military Intelligence Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Contemporary Insurgent Warfare Course. He has served in various positions, to include operations officer, Production Management Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency; analyst, Multinational Forces, Iraq; and as a U.S. Army military intelligence soldier, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and the United Kingdom and Germany, from University of Massachusetts and an M.A from Norwich University. His military education includes Airborne School, Defense Language Institute (Russian and Spanish), Military Intelligence Noncommissioned Officer Course, and Contemporary Insurgent Warfare Course. He has served in various positions, to include operations officer, Production Management Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency; analyst, Multinational Forces, Iraq; and as a U.S. Army military intelligence soldier, Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and the United Kingdom and Germany.
"Cavalry leadership then requires peculiar qualities; a quick eye to see a fleeting opportunity, the boldness for an equally quick decision to grasp it, the clearness of mind to form a good plan quickly, the ability to convey that plan to subordinates in short clear orders and the firmness of will to carry through the plan adopted."

-Brigadier General Lincoln C. Andrews
The MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) unit is one of the many iconic images that come to mind when discussing the Korean War, due in part to the movie and television series (both entitled M.A.S.H.). Many however, remember a MASH as something more than this. Many lives were saved by the tireless work of the doctors, nurses and the support staff at a MASH.

During the closing years of the Second World War the Army experimented with bringing medical evacuation and treatment closer to the front lines. The Cavalry Journal from March /April of 1945 wrote about special training that was set up in order to increase the speed in which injuries could be treated.

“...so to facilitate prompt medical aid for individual casualties, a special training program was set up for the Medical Detachment, 125th Cavalry Squadron. Among other things the program called for one half-track ambulance and two aid men to accompany each troop on its mission. This plan enabled the ambulance to retrace its route when returning to the aid station (which would either be with or close to squadron headquarters) instead of being dispatched from there to go forward and locate a troop and its casualties. Another advantage derived from this practice was the reduction in the time lag between infliction of the wound and receipt of medical aid.”

During World War II the Army had set up an Echelon system that consisted of five Echelons. “Sick and wounded from the unit areas of front line battalions, regiments and other units are brought to Echelon I and then evacuated from there as indicated by their medical condition and medical needs. Each echelon does only as much as necessary, either to return the casualty to duty or to safely evacuate the casualty to the next higher echelon.” The third Echelon consisted of what was the precursor to the MASH unit because some of the hospitals at this level were semi-mobile. There were some inherent flaws with this system. The mobility of the hospital was limited, and there was a shortage of doctors and nurses that could effectively support the hospital.

After the war ended, the concept of the MASH was developed to correct these errors and make it possible to have a hospital that would have a staff of trained doctors and nurses, along with the tools to be truly mobile while still being able to treat patients during a move. The MASH would act as close support to the front lines which meant that the MASH could follow the combat troops when they engaged the enemy. Because of this close support, a MASH needed to be ready to move at a moment’s notice. During the Korean War seven MASH units were in operation, but not all at the same time, with several coming into service as late as 1952.

The MASH was seen as a promising experiment after the close of World War II because of the effectiveness of getting wounded soldiers to hospitals sooner by having installations that could handle the injuries. The statistics that have been compiled show that because of this increased attention to medical care, those that were wounded had a better chance of surviving the Korean War (2.4% died of wounds) than a soldier during World War II (3.7% died of wounds).

The helicopter became a key instrument of the MASH unit due to its ability to quickly move around the rough terrain of Korea that most other vehicles could not reach. Their use, however, was limited to transporting the seriously wounded from the battlefield to the MASH and if need be, to one of the permanent hospital locations. “The time for an evacuation flight could take from five minutes to ninety minutes.” Later on in the war the MASH helicopters helped to resupply the combat troops in order to not waste a flight by not carrying any equipment into the combat zone. The H-13 “Sioux” was the small workhorse helicopter that is easily recognized because of the bubble canopy. Over the course of the war this helicopter would be modified to give it better
range and ability to transport the wounded. The H-19, the helicopter introduced near the end of the war, was able to carry more wounded.

Each MASH was assigned four helicopters along with pilots and mechanics. The helicopter, though, was not the only means of transporting the wounded. A MASH would also have an ambulance platoon attached to bring non-serious injuries back from the front lines to the MASH, similar to the echelon system. Once a patient was stable, they would then be transported to the rear in order to free up space inside the MASH.

The mobile aspect of the MASH meant that the hospital needed to be able to move if the front lines shifted in either direction. Depending on the location, there were times when the units would set up in a permanent structure such as an old hangar or warehouse, although it was more common that the MASH units would have to make do with tents. The logistics of moving an entire MASH unit were staggering. Not only did the equipment and tents need to be moved, but electricity, water and sanitation needed to be addressed at the new site.

When it came time for a MASH to move, approximately six hours were given to have the entire hospital taken down and moved, with setup taking another five or six to get everything up and running. The hospital was divided into tent sections. The layout of the hospital generally was set up to start with a receiving and pre-op ward with a separate tent for surgery that was connected to the receiving tent. Post-op and holding tents were the last part of the set up. To move a MASH it happened in two phases.

“Phase I, the tents housing the registrar and receiving-and-holding are taken down. The laboratory, the pharmacy, and the admitting functions of receiving are moved into the preoperative ward. The tentage that has been struck is then moved to a new location with half of the personnel of preoperative, postoperative, surgical, and central supply, plus one receiving clerk. At the new location a second basic U is formed, consisting of preoperative, postoperative and surgical. Central supply functions of sterilizing instruments and dressings are carried out in the surgical tent.

At one point, therefore, there are two functioning hospitals. The hospital in the rear continues to admit patients until the forward installation is complete. When the advance unit begins to receive patients, the rear installation stops all admissions. When its patients have been evacuated, the rear unit moves up and joins the advance hospital as Phase II of the move. The tentage of Phase II is added externally to the basic U in its new location. The medical officers and enlisted men who have not yet moved come with Phase II. All nurses move with the rear element.”

Once the wounded had been medevaced to the MASH, the treatment could begin. For a MASH unit this meant all kinds of wounds, from shrapnel and bullet wounds to sickness and mental illness which required the doctors to be prepared for all kinds of possibilities.

“Traditional triage involved the classification of wounded patients into three groups. The first group included those whose wounds were not life threatening and who could safely wait for treatment. The second group consisted of those with life threatening wounds who, if treated promptly, would live. The third group were those with little chance of survival regardless of availability of surgical care.”

Typically those that had to be brought in by the helicopters were at the top of the list to be treated.

Improvisation became a key component of the MASH, not only were medical supplies improvised but also the daily work of the MASH personnel. “Every doctor, regardless of his specialty or training, became a surgeon.” When it came to equipment typically there was little to go around or it was not up to par with the needs of the MASH. In some cases lighting was not adequate enough to perform surgery, so cans had to be fitted around the light bulbs to focus the light. Other times two sinks had to be created, “the doctors and nurses rigged two cans, one to hold water and pour through the second which had holes in the bottom to act as a faucet.”

Daily life at a MASH was not always comfortable; any comforts from home were long forgotten. Basic necessities were always in demand at a MASH. Since the units relied on generators for all of their electrical needs, this meant that the surgical tent would be the focus of the MASH with other electrical needs only
considered secondary. The generators also provided the heat for the hospital, but if a generator broke down, then the unit would have to work without it.\textsuperscript{11} Dressing in layers was not an uncommon site during the cold winter months in Korea. The patients also had to be covered in blankets and kept as warm as possible in the cold weather.

Water was needed, not just for drinking, but also for cleaning laundry and cleaning and sterilizing the surgical equipment. Water trucks needed to be used so that a steady supply could keep the MASH operating. Water was always a concern for the MASH, without it they would not have been able to sterilize any of the surgical equipment.

The work load was large as was to be expected. “Everybody worked around the clock without orders of any kind. Indeed, it became [Van Buskirk’s] duty as MASH commander to point-blank order people to bed. There was no end to the work. You could work 24 hours pretty well straight through. The next day you would nap between cases. You would go to sleep at midnight and sleep till you were needed and someone woke you up. Then the cycle would start all over again.”\textsuperscript{12}

Sanitation was a major concern of any MASH since they were operating in the field but needed a sterile environment in which to operate. This meant that placement of latrines needed to be worked out, rats needed to be killed at the trash piles, fleas needed to be dealt with and even at times amputated limbs needed to be buried in order to not attract any more pests.

The effectiveness of the MASH in Korea meant that they would be used for future American conflicts up until they were replaced by an even more mobile option, the CSH (Casualty Surgical Hospital). The CSH is meant to be a smaller hospital than the MASH and with the decreased size, it also means that they are able to deploy much closer to the front lines and be much more mobile than the MASH. In 2005 the 212th MASH (the last MASH unit) had been deployed as part of a relief mission to provide aid to Pakistan after a devastating earthquake. After completing their mission, the 212th was handed over to Pakistan in 2006 as part of the relief effort, thus ending the long and distinguished service of the MASH.

The MASH represented experimentation and innovation. Many lives were saved because of the actions taken by all of the personnel in a MASH, from the pilots to the doctors, nurses and the rest of the staff. Their ability to act quickly and fearlessly allowed them to save lives and have a significant impact on the war.

Notes

9 Ibid, 96.
10 Ibid, 94.
12 Ibid, 121.
Close Ties between the U.S. Cavalry Association and MASH

Dr. James Eugene “Gene” Hemphill was born on August 29, 1915 in Clay Center, Kansas, near Fort Riley, Kansas. Dr. Hemphill son of John and May Tempero Hemphill is a cousin of U.S. Cavalry Association president, Bill Tempero.

After receiving his medical degree from the University of Kansas in 1941, he served overseas in the Army Medical Corps during WWII. After the war, he pursued his interest in burn treatment and reconstructive surgery and became the second plastic surgeon in the U.S. Armed Forces. He was one of the doctors involved in setting up M.A.S.H. (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) units in Korea. During the Korean Conflict he was stationed in Japan and Korea and ended his military career as commander of M.A.S.H. units in Vietnam. Dr. Hemphill passed away on October 3, 2003 after a long, distinguished military career.

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