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The “Pack Out!”

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Notes on the Use of Cavalry in the American Revolution
by
Frederic Gilbert Bauer

Parts IV-V
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IV

If there was any failure to appreciate the need of cavalry at the opening of the New York campaign, it must have been short lived, for on November 29, 1776, Congress appointed a committee of five "to consider and report a proper method for establishing and training a cavalry in this continent," and on December 12 appointed Elisha Sheldon of Connecticut lieutenant colonel commandant, to raise and train a regiment of cavalry. How great the exigency was is shown by the fact that the companies were ordered to report to General Washington as soon as raised, without waiting for the regiment to be complete.

This regiment, later known as the 2nd Continental Dragoons, served throughout the war. It was principally recruited in Connecticut, though there were enlistments from other colonies, chiefly New York and Massachusetts. The earliest roll of the 1st Dragoons (Col. Theodore Bland) is for November, 1777, and I have found no record of its service before that date, although a commission in the regiment is dated as early as June, 1776. If this date is correct, it lends support to the view I have expressed above, that the reason cavalry was not used in the American army in the campaigns of 1776 was because efficient cavalry could not be raised. In the light of the vote of November 29, given above, it seems more probable that the date of the commission is wrongly given. The extant rolls indicate that the 3rd Dragoons (Col. George Baylor) and the 4th Dragoons (Col. Stephen Moylan) were raised in 1777. Zebulon Pike, father of the explorer, was a cornet in the latter regiment. There was also in the continental establishment Capt. Bartholomew von Heer's independent troop, enlisted for the duration of the war and composed largely of Germans, which appears to have served from July, 1778, to April, 1783.

Beside the continental regiments the only colonies to furnish cavalry were Connecticut (5 regiments of militia dragoons), New Jersey (Nixon's troop, 1777, and William Crane's troop, 1780), Virginia (Gen. Nelson's corps of light dragoons and Capt. Thomas Watkins' troop), North Carolina (a regiment of light dragoons, and South Carolina (Capt. Matthew Singleton's troop, from St. Mark's Parish and Lieut. Col. Henry Hampton's regiment). This last organization, which was in service 1781 to 1782, received pay and bounty in "grown" and "small" negroes, and the only roll in the War Department shows 39¾ grown negroes due Capt. Barnett. Just how three-fourths of a negro would be paid might make an interesting problem for one the service schools.

It will be noted that the continental cavalry were dragoons. The spirit of economy in military matters is not new, and our ancestors could not see the advantage of equipping a light trooper who could serve only on horseback when for practically the same cost they could have a dragoon who could fight either mounted or dismounted. Congress learned from experience, however, as it has sometimes done in later years, and as a matter of fact, if we can judge from the few equipment rolls extant, the mounted troops were actually equipped as light cavalry, for their only arms were the sword and pistol. Another curious fact which these rolls reveal is that the 2nd Dragoons, and probably the other regiments, at least in the latter part of the war, had four mounted troops and two dismounted companies of light infantry.

The spirit of economy also appears in a vote of March 2, 1778, wherein Congress urges "those enjoying gifts of fortune to set a laudable example," and calls on "young gentlemen of property and spirit" to organize cavalry troops to serve for the remainder of the year at their own expense, except for rations and forage. Truly the colonial idea of equites equo private and that cavalry service was a rich man's game was hard in dying out. On September 11, 1778, Congress asked Washington whether some of the cavalry
could not be dispensed with or ordered elsewhere to save expense.

March 14, 1777, Congress approved the organization for the cavalry. Each regiment was to have a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, quartermaster, surgeon, surgeon’s mate, paymaster, adjutant, saddler, trumpet major, 4 supernumeraries, and 6 troops, each consisting of a captain, lieutenant, cornet, quartermaster sergeant, orderly or drill sergeant, trumpeter, farrier, armorer, 4 corporals and 32 privates, a total of 279 to a regiment. The muster rolls show, of course, that the troops were not always full, but they also show that the prescribed strength was frequently exceeded, the troops sometimes having over 50 enlisted men. September 5, 1777, on recommendation of the Board of War, Count Casimir Pulaski was appointed chief of cavalry, or, as it was called, “commander of the horse,” with the rank of brigadier general, a position which he held until March 28, 1778, when he was authorized to raise his celebrated “Legion,” to consist of 68 horse and 200 foot, the former to be armed with lances and the latter to be equipped in the manner of light infantry. Its strength was later increased to 8 companies: 3 line cavalry, 1 chasseurs, 2 line infantry or fusiliers, 1 grenadiers, and 1 supernumerary. The cavalry had pack transportation. The organization of this corps fitted it for a wide variety of service, and for its size it seems to have been an efficient command.

As Pulaski’s service was henceforth with his Legion, the cavalry appears to have been without a chief until November 24, 1778, when Washington was authorized to appoint one of the brigadiers of infantry to command the cavalry.

V

From 1778 to the end of the war, during which period the principal theatre of operations was in the four Southern states, both sides had real cavalry under able cavalry leaders, of whom the most noted were Tarleton on the British side and Count Pulaski and Lieut. Cols. William Washington and Henry (“Light Horse Harry”) Lee on that of the Americans. This period is also featured by the organization of “Partisan corps” of “legions,” which were small semi-independent commands. Pulaski’s corps was from the start a mixed command of cavalry and infantry, as stated above; those of Lee and Armand originally consisted of 3 cavalry troops each, but Lee’s, at least, was later enlarged and had light infantry added.

With the acquisition of real cavalry, able cavalry leaders, and the true cavalry spirit, opportunities to use them were not wanting. Although the bodies of cavalry on both sides were small according to our modern ideas, Lee’s Memoirs show that they were actively engaged in delaying actions, raids, advance and rear guard work, and reconnaissances, beside being used with the other arms on the battlefield. Pulaski’s Legion by its sixty day march South helped relieve Charleston in May, 1779, and on June 20 took part in the engagement at Stono Ferry. Here, according to Lee, they were “brave but undisciplined,” and, though without the personal presence of their leader, they gallantly charged the disorganized British and, when their attack was checked by well directed fire, they retired in good order. At Savannah, October 9, they made a charge, in which Pulaski received his death wound, and took part in the siege. Lee expresses the opinion that had not Pulaski been killed, their charge might have decided the day in favor of the Americans.

At the siege of Charleston in 1780 a detachment of American cavalry stationed at Monck’s Corner, 30 miles north of the city, to maintain communications with the North, were surprised and defeated on April 14 by Tarleton, who captured 100 prisoners and 400 horses, which latter he used to replace those of his own command which had been thrown overboard on the voyage from New York. William Washington and some others managed to escape capture by their knowledge of the country. The raiding spirit was especially strong in Tarleton, and by a forced march he successively defeated a force of mountain militia which was mobilizing on the Santee River, on May 6, 1780, and on May 29, at Waxhaws, S.C., the 3rd Virginia Regiment, which was marching to Charleston. On this occasion Tarleton’s force of 170 dragoons marched 105 miles in 54 hours. The defeat was undoubtedly due to the failure of Lieut. Col. Buford, the American commander, to use his cavalry properly, for, though he had a small mounted force with him, and his entire command numbered 400, he failed to put out any rear guard or to have the roads in his rear patrolled. In June, 1781, occurred the combined raids to Charlottesville and the Point of Fork, Va., 50
miles above Richmond. In the former, Tarleton with 180 dragoons and 70 mounted infantry destroyed stores and narrowly missed capturing Governor Jefferson and the entire Virginia Legislature; in the latter, Simcoe with 100 cavalry and 800 infantry forced Steuben to retreat. On June 25, however, a mounted raiding party under Simcoe was successfully attacked by American cavalry at Spencer’s Ordinary, and in July, 1781, Tarleton made a march of 400 miles in 15 days across the Virginia mountains to destroy stores which Steuben was collecting, but arrived too late to destroy anything but a quantity of tobacco.

The first major battle in which cavalry played an important part was Camden, August 17, 1780. The only cavalry in the American force was Armand’s corps, which fled with the militia, whereupon Cornwallis, seeing that he had only infantry opposed to him, sent Tarleton’s cavalry, which had been stationed behind the lines, to attack the American rear and pursue the fugitives. Sumter with his partisans was near at hand, and Tarleton continued his pursuit up the Catawba, surprising Sumter in his camp at Fisher’s Creek two days later and, with a loss of 6 killed and 9 wounded, killed 150 and captured 300 of Sumter’s men. Sumter himself escaping without hat, coat, or boots.

Placing the cavalry in rear of the second line of infantry was a favorite device of both sides in this campaign. At Cowpens, January 17, 1781, Tarleton, who was in command of the British, placed his main body of cavalry in the second line and a troop of dragoons on each flank. Morgan, the American commander, placed William Washington’s cavalry force of 125 under cover of a hill well to the rear. When the dragoons on the British right tried to turn Morgan’s left, William Washington came out and drove them back. When Morgan’s right was changing front to meet the British left, which outflanked them, Tarleton, thinking the Americans were retreating, ordered his main body of cavalry to come in on his left and charge. Before they could do this, however, Morgan gave his famous order: “Face about and fire once more.” The effect of this deliberately aimed volley of the Continentals and the arrival at the same time of Morgan’s militia, which, after their first volleys, had retired as ordered and had now made the loop of the battlefield and come up on the American right, threw the British into a panic, of which William Washington was quick to take advantage by a vigorous pursuit. Tarleton, however, managed to collect 14 officers and 40 troopers and with them checked the pursuit long enough for the British force to escape.

The Battle of Guilford Court House, N.C., March 15, 1781, began with a cavalry duel on the preceding day between Lee and Tarleton, in which Lee had the advantage, and on the morning of the battle, Lee after a brisk skirmish with the British advance guard four miles from the battlefield, fell back to the position which Greene had taken up with his infantry in three lines. William Washington’s cavalry being posted on the right and Lee’s on the left of the second line, which was 300 yards behind the first and 550 yards in advance of the third, which was on a slight hill. The British cavalry was in rear of their reserve. When the militia of Greene’s first line retired and the second line was drawn back, the British made two attacks on his third line, the first of which was repulsed. The second attack, made by the Guards under Gen. O’Hara, routed the 2nd Maryland, a new regiment, but as the Guards advanced, the 1st Maryland wheeled to the left in a flank attack and drove them back. This was William Washington’s opportunity, and he joined in the pursuit of the flying Guards. What part the cavalry took in the subsequent withdrawal of Greene’s army we do not know.

At Hobkirk’s Hill, April 25, 1781, Green had only William Washington’s cavalry, Lee’s Legion having been detached. Greene’s plan was a double envelopment by the infantry and, when the British were fully committed, to have the cavalry, which was posted behind one flank, go around the British flank and attack their rear. Unfortunately the outcome of the infantry battle gave no opportunity for this plan to be carried out.

Lee again brought on a battle at Eutaw Springs, S.C., September 8, 1781, by attacking a party of British sent out to dig sweet potatoes. Greene drew up his force in two lines, with Lee on the right flank and William Washington in the rear. When the infantry charged the advancing British with the bayonet, Greene sent his cavalry to charge both British flanks.

Continued on page 17
It Had Been a Very Long Night
by
Trooper Niven Baird

Following the withdrawal of the 3rd Marine Division from northern I Corps of Vietnam in November, 1969, the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was left in the hands of the Army’s 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division. The various battalions of the brigade took turns occupying the northern-most fire bases, including Con Thien, the scene of several hard-fought battles by the marines against the soldiers of North Vietnam. Just south of Con Thien lay an old artillery base which became known as C-2, and which was occupied by the headquarters of the forward based battalion, along with some of the subordinate companies. The nomenclature, “C-2" was derived from the series of fire bases which stretched from the South China Sea westward to serve as blocking positions against incursions by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). These positions were known as the McNamara Line. Con Thien was designated as A-4, and it too was occupied by one or more companies of the battalion.

With the large marine division gone, several of the previously manned fire-bases had to be abandoned due to lack of manpower. The army brigade remaining in the DMZ area was about one-fifth the size of the reinforced marine division. Thus C-2 and A-4 were the western-most occupied fire bases. The battalion occupying the two fire-bases conducted limited forays further west, but these excursions were normally for short periods of time.

During this period, the NVA dedicated great effort implanting anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines throughout the area south of the DMZ, and all too many personnel carriers, A-Cavs and tanks were finding these mines with significant loss due to the damage inflicted.

A large hill mass arose approximately 1500 meters west of C-2, and the marine division engineers (or probably Sea Bees) had created a cut in the hill to permit vehicles to more easily transit westward. The cut was about 15 feet high on each side and the roadway was nearly that same width. The brigade used the cut to gain access to the western area whenever the screening operations took forces out to the west.

In early December of 1969, the reinforced tank battalion I had the honor of leading was pulling the duty on the DMZ. It had been some time since U. S. forces had ventured westward for any significant distance, and the NVA had enjoyed free reign over that area. My S-3 and I decided it would be useful to create a presence out there, so we planned an operation scheduled to last almost a week. The first hurdle was getting through the cut, because without the luxury of a helicopter, we had no idea what might lay “just over the hill.” Therefore, our permanently attached armored cavalry troop, was to proceed ahead to scout out the route through the cut.

Shortly after sun-up, the Troop ventured out of C-2 with the troop commander in constant radio contact with his trailing scout squad. The last vehicle through the cut was ordered to relay

"Terrain just west of Fire Base C-2 on the DMZ. The hill with the SeaBee made cut is 600 yards north and west of this location."
to the troop commander that safe passage had been accomplished. My S-3 and I in our tanks were monitoring the troop net. Just as the safe passage message was transmitted, the entire world seemed to erupt in dirt and noise! The wet monsoon had not yet arrived, so it was not until the cooler hours after nightfall that the dirt cloud settled sufficiently to permit investigation. At first light the next morning, the troop commander, my engineer platoon leader and I met in the cut to examine what had occurred.

The NVA “drafted” local youth in the northern half of the DMZ to perform as laborers during the hours of darkness, mainly carrying mines into the U.S. side of the DMZ, and burying them. As we reconstructed what had occurred in this case, the following scenario seemed to be the most likely.

Over a period of time, the NVA had buried mines in the roadway of the cut, placing them generally in the middle of the roadway so as to be under the center of any vehicles attempting to use the cut. Mines, similar to U.S. Claymores, were imbedded in the sides of the cut so that when detonated, all personnel riding on top of vehicles would be killed by the flying shards of metal and glass. The mines were all wired for detonation “on command”. Both sides of the cut and the roadway were thus armed. The cut was approximately 200 yards long, so many nights had been devoted to placing the mines in anticipation of catching a column of U.S. vehicles in the cut. Three firing mechanisms were found in a clump of vegetation a few yards back from the northern lip of the cut, one for each side of the cut, and one for the mines in the roadway.

So, as we attempted to reconstruct what had happened, we could envision young Nguyen working night-after-night with others of his ilk, carrying mines across the Ben Hai River (the actual DMZ) and on down to the area of the cut—a distance of about 4 kilometers. There, trained sappers (NVA demolition experts), would bury the mines, and the young men would be sent back for more of the explosive devices. Once enough mines were implanted, the wiring was attached and the firing mechanisms hidden in the brush overlooking the cut. As a reward for his hard work, Nguyen was given the very great honor of waiting for a convoy to appear, at which time, when the cut was full of vehicles belonging to the “long noses,” he was to close the firing circuits on all three of the fields of mines.

On the fateful day, Nguyen had worked all the previous night, returning to his place of concealment shortly before dawn. As the sun started to peep over the edge of the South China Sea, he, like a million other young soldiers in every army throughout history, fell asleep. The noise of the cav troop moving through the cut must have awakened him, just in time to see the last vehicle disappear out of the killing zone. In the words used by all young men who have just realized they have made a terrible blunder, we can all hear him say to himself, “Oh S***”, and in a panic, he closed the firing circuits. Under the cover of the dust of many tons of red laterite dirt thrown into the air, this young soldier knew only one thing—he could not go back to his unit.

There is little doubt but that he took advantage of the information dropped by leaflets explaining how an NVA soldier, wanting to escape the hardships of his life, could desert and become a “Chieu Hoi”. By turning himself into a U.S. or Army of South Vietnam unit, he would be given retraining in the South Vietnamese way of life. Thus, our Nguyen probably became a South Vietnamese citizen!

"M-60 tank on DMZ repaired from mine-caused track and suspension damage, and ready to go again."
By the time you are reading this the Summer Olympics will have closed. You may remember a few issues back I wrote about Hiram Tuttle competing in the 1936 Olympics, but this time I thought we could look at the American participation in several other Olympic Games. The library holds items ranging from the 1932 games to the 1956 games in Stockholm. The majority of the collection, though, centers on 1932 and 1936 due to the participation of Hiram Tuttle, and many of the Olympic items are from his collection.

The first item is from the American Olympic Committee Report from the 1932 games. Presented here is a partial clipping from the five page equestrian report. It features a summary of the events and placing of the competitors from the equestrian events. The report is given by Major General Guy V. Henry who was the director of the Equestrian Events at these games.

The photograph to the left is of the Olympic Stadium, or as it is currently known, the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum. This stadium was a home to both the 1932 and 1984 Olympic Games and has solidified itself as a landmark. Since its construction in the 1920s, this stadium has not only housed Olympic competition but also numerous professional sports teams, as well as being the current home to the University of Southern California Trojans football team.
The item below is a ticket from the equestrian events from the 1932 games in Los Angeles. The price on the ticket is shown to be $2.00. The item to the left, a program from 1932 shows the cost of the various events such as a season ticket for boxing costing $12.00. It must also be remembered that these Olympics took place during the Great Depression and that the average annual salary was about $1,300. Today a ticket to the Olympic Equestrian event finals can be as high as $80 per ticket.

I have discussed some of the 1936 Olympics in Berlin before in a previous article, but when talking about these games it is almost a necessity to talk about Jesse Owens. He is the iconic American athlete at these Olympic games. He won four gold medals in track and field competitions. Below is a photo of him during the 200m event, he also won in the 100m, 4 x 100m and the long jump.

This is just a small sample of what the U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library has to offer. Many of the records housed here deal with the equestrian events and the time leading up to them, but we do have records and photographs from other Olympic events as well. If a particular item has piqued your interest and you would like to explore it further please give us a call or email us. The contact information is on the inside cover of this journal.
The “Pack Out!”
by
Captains Loren B. Hillsinger and James E. Glattly, 14th Cavalry
Reprinted from the Cavalry Journal May-June, 1941

One of the most obvious lessons learned from the present war is that the scope of Cavalry has been broadened to include an ability to maintain sustained combat, dismounted, with the horse temporarily absent—too far from the trooper to render the equipment on him available for immediate use, and yet close enough to bring the animal up in order to realize fully that precious mobility which spells success in modern warfare. This lesson is not entirely new, but it is new in the importance to which action of this type has advanced in consideration. This advance is not made to the exclusion of delaying actions, pursuit, harassment, reconnaissance, and other typical Cavalry roles but in addition to those roles.

To rise tactically to this demand is not a great task. But the fact remains clear that the present method of packing is not best suited for this new role. It was devised primarily for the former typical types of action before this new phase became so paramount. In other words we must look at this new problem and, as far as it is concerned, consider ourselves as mounted infantry in order to acquire the best angle of approach, bearing in mind constantly that it is in addition to our other old problems.

With this in mind, it first had to be determined what equipment was wanted; whether it was wanted on the horse or on the person, or on the truck; WHEN IT WAS WANTED IN THOSE PLACES; and a decision of how it was going to be placed and arranged in those places so as to:
(1) be compact on the truck
(2) be accessible to the man
(3) be sparing on the energy and body of the horse and man.

This involved study and experimentation. First we had to “think-out” the situation outlined above. The result of this was to decide that the art of packing consisted of four essentials:

(1) to carry only the indispensable
(2) to distribute its weight properly and equally so as to fatigue man and horse the least.
(3) to give the trooper the greatest possible facility in the use of his arms.
(4) to give the trooper those items of equipment essential not only to his contentment, but to his comfort and health as well.

In computing the list of indispensable equipment it must be remembered that a war time situation is visualized wherein worn-out clothing is replaced without lengthy requisitions and time-consuming procedure; wherein the old soldier will wash his clothes and the young soldier had better learn to do likewise in a hurry. To paraphrase Kipling, “he who travels fastest, travels lightest.” We wanted to travel fast even at the risk of losing our reputation of a spit and polish outfit. That reputation would be willingly traded upon taking the field for one of speed. As Joe Bache, All American tackle of the Four Horseman Team, used to say in coaching his line after his graduation, “You’ve got to be fast—you’ve got to be fast, babies.”

Equipment
First, consider the trooper’s arms and associated equipment. He must have:

- Rifle with boot
- Pistol with clips
- Cartridge belt with suspenders with pocket magazine
- Hand grenades (still a moot question) (in dismounted canteen cover, as a suggested method of carrying).

Second, consider his personal needs. He demands:

- 2 shirts
- 2 breeches
- 6 pair socks
- toilet soap
- shaving brush
- field ration “C”
3 undershirts
3 drawers
1 raincoat
1 short coat (mackinaw)
1 windbreaker
1 undershirt, wool
2 pair boots (hobnailed
with heavy soles (??))
1 belt, waist web
toothpowder (cream or paste mashes)
1 sewing kit
1 notebook (pocket size)
1 extra pair boot laces
1 pencil
1 mess kit (complete, less
knife and fork)
1 canteen and cup with
cover (dismounted,
converted for mounted
use by sewing 2
web straps on rear)
first aid kit
identification tags
tobacco
toilet paper
1 barrack bag
4 handkerchiefs
1 razor with blades or strap
Shaving soap (cream mashes)

1 face towel
1 bath towel
1 wrist watch
gas mask
comb
boho with scabbard
toothbrush
1 helmet, steel

foot powder
2 bed blankets
shelter half with
pole, rope and
pins
pocket knife
(one blade
of awl type, utility
type)
matches

saddle
bridle, snaffle bit only,
curb available for
exceptional horses from
organization equipment
mohair cinch
saddle bags (pair)
2 canvas duck lining bags
(1 only with lift-a-dot
or buckle
flap and fitted with web
attachment and snap
hooks to attach into rings
of cartridge belt)
suspenders

feed bag
grain bag
surcingle
saddle blanket
curry comb
grooming brush
sponge
16 horseshoe nails
halter with shank
6 coat straps
2 saddle bag straps
set of fitted
horseshoes

Third, what horse equipment is essential? We
decided upon the following:

Now what of the officers and the non-
commissioned officers? Many long years ago
General DeBrache of the French Cavalry laid
down the rule that an officer should carry no
more than a trooper. We went farther in that we
eliminated some of the troopers’ equipment and
the substitutions we made did not meet the
amount subtracted, much less surpass it. The
actual saving in weight on both horse and truck

Above: Near and off sides, march pack. Below: Near and off sides, combat pack
amounts to some 25 pounds. We decided: (1) rifles would not be carried by officers, first sergeants, supply sergeants, mess sergeants, stable sergeants, buglers, machine gunners and assistant gunners, (2) the bolo would not be carried by officers or the first sergeants, however officers and non-commissioned officers of the first four grades would carry:

field glasses  flashlight
compasses  whistles
(corporals of machine gun platoon also carry field glasses)

Packing

In our estimate of where to carry these items we followed a tip from the Regimental Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, and devised a kit bag from materials on hand. A sketch of this bag is included and it will be observed that it demands nothing except those things actually on hand. The time consumed to construct it is approximately ½ a man-hour. Actually the troop saddler can turn one out in 15 minutes, which will do the trick, but not have fancy edges and neatly trimmed seams. This bag was to contain those essentials a man would need when leaving his horse for sustained dismounted action, including a day’s ration of type “C.” In order to do this we put the toilet articles in a face towel and put this in the mess kit. The knife and fork were left at home since the man has a pocket knife and a spoon represents the best utensil with which to eat the “C” type ration. Bath towels aren’t being used when sustained combat is around the corner and, besides, needing the room, we didn’t think a man would be interested in taking all of these mentioned items into a firefight. True, he might make the enemy a bit envious and lower his morale, but on the other hand he might make him so envious that he’d fight like the devil just to take them away from our men. Some enemies are just that rude and uncouth! However, swinging along the road when combat was not imminent, gave us another slant so we visualized a march pack for that purpose convertible into a combat pack, which would represent certain additions depending on the

Removing and attaching ditty bag to the field belt suspenders
situation confronting us. Here is the way we lined up the march pack:

I. ON HORSE:

a. On pommel
   1 outer garment (can be either raincoat, mackinaw or windbreaker, but not more than one).
   Rifle with boot—attached near pommel ring

b. Under saddle
   saddle blanket

c. On cantle
   grain bag
   feed bag

d. Near saddle bag
   grooming brush
   —in saddle bag pocket
   horseshoe nails
   —rolled in surcingling

e. Off saddle bag (see attached report on “ditty bag”)
   Mess kit—spoon only, 
   no knife or fork
   toilet articles—wrapped
   in face towel in mess kit
   1 pair socks
   sewing kit
   tobacco

f. Attached to off saddle bag straps
   canteen with cup and dismounted cover—2nd
   and 3rd saddle bag straps through loops of
   attached web straps

g. Attached to near saddle bag straps
   curry comb

II. ON PERSON:

Knife in pocket—on cord, end of which is tied
or sewed to lining of pocket.
Pistol and holster with pocket magazine on belt
First-aid kit on belt
Bolo on belt opposite pistol

Cartridge belt with suspenders
Handkerchiefs (around neck—about pistol—in hat)
Notebook and pencil in pocket
Matches in pocket
Toilet paper in hip pocket
Wrist watch

III. ON TRUCK IN BARRACK BAG:

a. All remainder of equipment, including extra
   fitted barium-treated horseshoes.

b. Barrack bags would be waterproofed with a
   standard waterproofing solution and grouped
   into squad bags, constructed of canvas capable
   of holding the 8 squad barrack bags. They
   would be plainly lettered: (i.e.: Tr “F” Plat 1
   Squad 2)

c. Such squad sacks would be grouped and
   strapped by respective platoons.

   The combat pack additions are issued
when the commander “smells a rat” and decides he had better slip on his brass knuckles. Whereupon he consults the following list of optional additions, shuts his eyes, selects any or all items, and sends a message to the Brigade that “morale is excellent, men and animals in fine fettle.” As they well should be, having been spared the maximum bother and expenditure of energy consistent with security. The additional list is as follows:

- Field rations in off saddle bag
- Extra ammunition in bandoleer
- about horse’s neck
- Steel helmet, worn on person
- Gas mask (if situation and action warrants) on off pommel
  (see photo), otherwise on truck.
- Hand grenades (in dismounted canteen cover—on cartridge belt)
  (may be carried without cover in shirt when dismounted—
  in near side saddle
  bag when mounted)

Final Remarks

We are now ready to go. Colloquially speaking, we may smell a bit when we get back, but every Cavalryman expects to smell a little bit. (Actually, as Mark Twain said, the verb is “stink”!) He can always make a remark about “pipe smoke, tweeds and horse sweat” and still steal the doughboy’s girl. He may come back clothed in rags, but if he takes advantage of the potential mobility we have given him he’ll be covered sufficiently with the “glory” that chaps like DeBrache, Forrest, and Stuart constantly sought and, strangely enough, got with just about half the equipment.

Oh, yes. There comes a time in every officer’s career when he feels he is expected to make a few pertinent remarks. Sometimes because he feels the troops have an idea he doesn’t mean business with a capital “B.” Some officers get it out of their system by haranguing The Cavalry Journal; others by delaying officers’ call, or by boring the men to death with their yap. Anyhow, here are a few suggested items and topics—they have been adopted as standard procedure in the 14th Horse.

1. As a general rule an officer should carry no more than a trooper.

2. The often seen practice of having orderlies carry personal supplies of officers should be rigidly and positively forbidden.

3. All articles of necessity to the trooper have been listed. Inspection by an officer will be made prior to departure from any permanent, or semi-permanent, camp to see that no additional items are carried. Frequent unexpected inspections should be made by officers at other times after packing out to make sure nothing has been acquired. Repeated offenders should be punished suitably to insure that such useless articles do not exhaust the strength of the horse. Squad leaders will be held responsible for persistent offenders.

4. Tongues of buckles on the pommel roll should point to the rear, except the center buckle which should point to the front.

5. Nothing on the pommel should rise above the pommel of the saddle.

6. After packing out and before mounting a trooper should always walk around the horse to inspect the load.

7. The modified Garand rifle boot was found to ride best when attached as follows: Carry the rifle as near the vertical as possible. Accomplish this by using a short front strap and lowering the rear strap approximately 6 inches toward the end of the boot. The end of this strap is then attached to the “D” ring of the cinch rather than to the near side cantle ring. This is preferable for 8 reasons:
   a. Rifle rides with less motion.
   b. Rifle less apt to injure animal.
   c. Rifle impossible to loosen or slide from boot at fast gaits or down steep inclines. No possibility of loss.
   d. Weight is suspended from high point of saddle and results in little or no leverage components due to lack of moment arm.
   e. Rifle may be withdrawn when mounted with no effort.
   f. Position of rifle prohibits trooper riding with “feet on dashboard,” thus riding the cantle. Results in trooper being forced into proper forward regulation seat.
   g. There is no obstruction to left leg in application of leg aids.
   h. By properly instructing men to raise rifle with both hands on stock it will slide from the boot easily. Result is that much valuable time is saved.
Necessity for Horsecavalry Under Modern Conditions

Mr. Engel: Is horsecavalry obsolete?

General Kromer: The question has been raised as to the necessity for horsecavalry under modern conditions in view of the great development of mechanization. It is because of the limitations of vehicles to perform the tasks assigned to cavalry under all conditions of terrain and weather.

Throughout the ages the army in the field has been a team composed of two main elements: One, a large, slow-moving, powerful element capable of delivering a smashing blow against a hostile force—this is infantry with guns; the other a smaller and faster moving force for reconnaissance and operations on the flanks, in rear and in pursuit of the enemy, and for appropriate independent missions. The horse has been the means of transportation for this second element—cavalry with guns. The masters of the art of war have always had these two elements in their teams and by skillful team play have always been able at times to effect a battle of annihilation of the opposing hostile force.

The question raised is, Can the modern iron horse supplant the animal horse in this lighter, more mobile element of the army combat team, realizing that the missions assigned to this more mobile element in campaign will have to be performed in the future no matter what may be the means of transportation? These missions require this element to proceed over every type of terrain suitable for military operations, even though rough, wooded, or cut up by streams, and under all conditions of weather and light or darkness. Demolitions and obstacles at critical points on varied terrain can effectively delay the progress of vehicles, and if these critical spots are defended the advance will be stopped until the hostile resistance is reduced and the route made passable. In any conceivable terrain for large operations there will be plenty of such critical places which an enterprising enemy will utilize. No such hostile action will be equally effective against horsecavalry.

So, simply from the point of view of being able to move rapidly across country to all portions of the battle area, horsecavalry must continue to be available in the army combat team. It has been suggested that the hostile machine guns will stop horsecavalry in its missions, as they have stopped the infantryman on foot. That is true when one is thinking of organized resistance, such as existed in the World War on the Western Front much of the time, where the opposing forces were in continuous contact and the flanks rested on impassable objects. As long as the whole front was fortified and intact and afforded no terrain open for maneuver there was no opportunity for the employment of larger cavalry forces; small elements of horsecavalry could be and were attached to infantry units for local reconnaissance and liaison. However, when maneuver room was provided by a rupture of the front, opportunity was afforded for the successful employment of larger cavalry units, and they were used.

It is believed that in the future, as in the past, when the cavalry reconnaissance encounters hostile resistance stronger than it can overcome it will secure the definite information of this force for the higher commander who will then be able to plan accordingly.

Vehicular reconnaissance alone will never be able to give the commander all the definite information required. It must be gathered either by men on horseback or men on foot and, considering varied terrain and the time element, horsecavalry must be available. Horsecavalry can overrun or outflank light resistance which may be encountered on varied terrain more quickly than can mechanized forces which, of necessity, must utilize ground favorable for vehicular movement.

Another aspect of this matter is that we have, in round numbers, 16 million animals in continental United States, which is more than all of Europe, less Russia, contains. Russia, with an animal population comparable to ours, maintains very large units of horsecavalry on an active status. The composition of the army combat

Continued on page 16
General J. E. B. Stuart's Report of his Cavalry Expedition into Pennsylvania in October, 1862

[The following report, which we print from an original MS. in General Stuart's own handwriting, does not appear in the Army of Northern Virginia reports, published by the Confederate Congress, and has, we believe, never been in print. Like everything from the great cavalry chieftain, it will attract attention and be read with interest.]

Reprinted from Southern Historical Society Papers

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, October 14th, 1862. Colonel K. H. CHILTON, A. A. General Army Northern Virginia:

Colonel—I have the honor to report that on the 9th instant, in compliance with instructions from the Commanding General Army of Northern Virginia, I proceeded on an expedition into Pennsylvania with a cavalry force of 1,800 and four pieces of horse artillery, under command of Brigadier-General Hampton and Colonels W. H. F. Lee and Jones. This force rendezvoused at Darksville at 12 M., and marched thence to the vicinity of Hedgesville, where it camped for the night. At daylight next morning (October 10th) I crossed the Potomac at McCoy's (between Williamsport and Hancock) with some little opposition, capturing two or three horses of the enemy's pickets. We were told here by citizens that a large force had camped the night before at Clear Spring, and were supposed to en route to Cumberland. We proceeded northward until we reached the turnpike leading from Hagerstown to Hancock (known as the National road). Here a signal station on the mountain and most of the party with their flags and apparatus were surprised and captured, and also eight or ten prisoners of war, from whom, as well as from citizens, I found that the large force alluded to had crossed but an hour ahead of me towards Cumberland, and consisted of six regiments of Ohio troops and two batteries, under General Cox, and were en route via Cumberland for the Kanawha. I sent back this intelligence at once to the Commanding General. Striking directly across the National road, I proceeded in the direction of Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, which point was reached about 12 M. I was extremely anxious to reach Hagerstown, where large supplies were stored, but was satisfied from reliable information that the notice the enemy had of my approach, and the proximity of his forces, would enable him to prevent my capturing it. I therefore turned towards Chambersburg.

I did not reach this point until after dark in a rain. I did not deem it safe to defer the attack till morning, nor was it proper to attack a place full of women and children without summoning it first to surrender. I accordingly sent in a flag of truce, and found no military or civil authority in the place, but some prominent citizens who met the officer were notified that the place would be occupied, and if any resistance were made the place would be shelled in three minutes. Brigadier-General Wade Hampton's command, being in advance, took possession of the place, and I appointed him military governor of the city. No incidents occurred during the night, during which it rained continuously. The officials all fled the town on our approach, and no one could be found who would admit that he held office in the place. About 275 sick and wounded in the hospital were paroled. During the day a large number of horses of citizens were seized and brought along. The wires were cut and railroad obstructed, and Colonel Jones' command was sent up the railroad toward Harrisburg to destroy a trestlework a few miles off. He however reported that it was constructed of iron, and he could not destroy it. Next morning it was ascertained that a large number of small arms and munitions of war were stored about the railroad buildings, all of which that could not be easily brought away were destroyed, consisting of about 5,000 new muskets, pistols, sabres and ammunition; also a large assortment of army clothing. The extensive machine shops and depot buildings of the railroad and several trains of loaded cars were entirely destroyed. From Chambersburg, I decided after mature
consideration to strike for the vicinity of Leesburg as the best route of return, particularly as Cox's command would have rendered the direction of Cumberland, full of mountain gorges, particularly hazardous. The route selected was through an open country. Of course I left nothing undone to prevent the inhabitants from detecting my real route and object. I started directly towards Gettysburg, but having passed the Blue Ridge, turned back towards Hagerstown for six or eight miles, and then crossed to Maryland by Emmettsburg, where as we passed we were hailed by the inhabitants with the most enthusiastic demonstrations of joy. A scouting party of 150 lancers had just passed towards Gettysburg, and I regretted exceedingly that my march did not admit of the delay necessary to catch them. Taking the road towards Frederick, we intercepted dispatches from Colonel Rush (lancers) to the commander of the scout, which satisfied me that our whereabouts was still a problem to the enemy. Before reaching Frederick I crossed the Monocacy, and continued the march through the night via Liberty, New Market and Monrovia, on Baltimore and Ohio railroad, where we cut the telegraph wires and obstructed the railroad. We reached at daylight Hyattstown, on McClellan's line of wagon communication with Washington; but we found only a few wagons to capture, and pushed on to Barnsville, which we found just vacated by a company of the enemy's cavalry. We had here corroborated what we had heard before that Stoneman had between four and five thousand troops about Poolesville, and guarding the river fords. I started directly for Poolesville, but instead of marching upon that point I avoided it by a march through the woods, leaving it two or three miles to my left, and getting into the road from Poolesville to the mouth of the Monocacy. Guarding well my flanks and rear, I pushed boldly forward, meeting the head of the enemy's column going toward Poolesville. I ordered the charge, which was responded to in handsome style by the advance squadron (Irving's) of Lee's brigade, which drove back the enemy's cavalry upon the column of infantry advancing to occupy the crest from which the cavalry were driven. Quick as thought Lee's sharpshooters sprang to the ground, and engaging the infantry skirmishers, held them in check till the artillery in advance came up, which, under the gallant Pelham, drove back the enemy's force upon his batteries beyond the Monocacy, between which and our solitary gun quite a spirited fire continued for some time. This answered, in connection with the high crest occupied by our piece, to screen entirely my real movement quickly to the left, making a bold and rapid strike for White's ford to force my way across before the enemy at Poolesville and Monocacy could be aware of my design.

Although delayed somewhat by about 200 infantry, strongly posted in the cliffs over the ford; yet they yielded to the moral effect of a few shells before engaging our sharpshooters, and the crossing of the canal, now dry, and river was effected with all the precision of passing a defile on drill a section of artillery being sent with the advance and placed in position on the Loudoun side, another piece on the Maryland height, while Pelham continued to occupy the attention of the enemy with the other, withdrawing from position to position until his piece was ordered to cross. The enemy was marching from Poolesville in the meantime, but came up in line of battle on the Maryland bank only to receive a thundering salutation, with evident effect, from our guns on this side. I lost not a man killed on the expedition, and only a few slight wounds. The enemy's loss is not known, but Pelham's one gun compelled the enemy's battery to change its position three times.

The remainder of the march was destitute of interest. The conduct of the command and their behavior towards the inhabitants is worthy of the highest praise; a few individual cases only were exceptions in this particular. Brigadier-General Hampton and Colonels Lee, Jones, Wickham and Butler, and the officers and men under their command are entitled to my lasting gratitude for their coolness in danger and cheerful obedience to orders. Unoffending persons were treated with civility, and the inhabitants were generous in proffers of provisions on the march. We seized and brought over a large number of horses, the property of citizens of the United States. The valuable information obtained in this reconnaissance as to the distribution of the enemy's force was communicated orally to the Commanding General, and need not be here repeated. A number of public functionaries and prominent citizens were taken captives and brought over as hostages for our own unoffending citizens whom
the enemy has torn from their homes and confined in dungeons in the North. One or two of my men lost their way, and are probably in the hands of the enemy.

I marched from Chambersburg to Leesburg (90 miles), with only an hour's halt, in thirty-six hours, including a forced passage of the Potomac a march without a parallel in history.

The results of this expedition in a moral and political point of view can hardly be estimated, and the consternation, among property holders in Pennsylvania beggars description.

I am specially indebted to Captain B. S. White (Confederate States cavalry), and to Messrs. Hugh Logan and Harbaugh, whose skillful guidance was of immense service to me. My staff are entitled to my thanks for untiring energy in the discharge of their duties.

I enclose a map of the expedition drawn by Captain W. W. Blackford to accompany this report; also a copy of orders enforced during the march.

Believing that the hand of God was clearly manifested in the signal deliverance of my command from danger, and the crowning success attending it, I ascribe to Him the praise, the honor and the glory. I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General Commanding Cavalry.

Continued from page 13

Necessity for Hor sed Cavalry Under Modern Conditions

teams of the other large military powers of Europe is influenced in great measure by the resources available; the amount of hor sed cavalry that is maintained is dependent upon the animal resources, which are limited. None of them have entirely eliminated hor sed cavalry.

Our possession of great resources of animals is a military asset of tremendous importance, as it permits the maintenance on the most economical and efficient basis of an indispensable element in our army combat team.

The potential value of our large and highly developed motor industry as a military asset of tremendous importance is evident. It permits the inclusion of armored vehicles into our military team to the extent necessary to produce the most effective army combat team. This industry is being utilized in the development of mechanized cavalry.

While our hor sed cavalry has great firepower, a high degree of tactical and cross-country mobility and is more easily concealed, it has not the strategic or road mobility of our mechanized cavalry, nor its crushing power.

Our combination of hor sed and mechanized cavalry gives us versatility in insuring continuity of action, night and day, and the greatest application of force when and where needed, and ability to use that form of powerful, mobile fighting troops which is best adapted to the particular terrain in which the operation occurs.
Notes on the Use of Cavalry in the American Revolution

Washington was defeated and captured, but Lee, with the assistance of the infantry, drove all before him until checked by those of the British who had thrown themselves into the “Brick House.”

Another feature of the campaign in the South was the extensive use on the American side of mounted riflemen. These were militia, usually from the more remote settlements, who travelled on horseback, but fought dismounted, and thus formed a highly mobile support to the cavalry, with whom they were often joined for independent operations. Tarleton had also at times a few mounted infantry, whom he used in a similar manner. The most noted service of these mounted riflemen on the American side was at the Battle of King’s Mountain, October 7, 1780, when a force of 1,100 British regulars and Tory militia took up a defensive position on top of a wooded hill, where they were surrounded by about 1,500 “over mountain men,” backwoods hunters who had quickly assembled on horseback, carrying their entire equipment on the saddle. On arrival at the battlefield they dismounted and climbed the hill, pouring in a deadly fire from their rifles, which they well knew how to use with effect. The British lost 224 killed, 163 wounded, and 716 prisoners, as against an American loss of 28 killed and 60 wounded.

At Yorktown the British had for cavalry the Queen’s Rangers, enlisted strength 248, under Simcoe, and the British Legion, 192 enlisted, under Tarleton, whereas the Americans had 60 dragoons of Moylan’s regiment, 40 of Armand’s corps, and the Duke de Lauzun’s Legion, 600 strong, of whom half were cavalry. The British cavalry were stationed at Gloucester, across the river from Yorktown, whence Cornwallis expected they could forage for the besieged army. On October 3, however, while a large part of the garrison of Gloucester, including the cavalry, was out on such a foraging expedition, they were suddenly overtaken by the French cavalry supported by some American militia infantry. Lauzun charged at once and drove Tarleton off the field. He reformed his cavalry, however, under cover of the infantry and advanced, but was checked by the fire of Lieut. Col. Mercer’s militia. This was the last time the British cavalry left their fortifications in Gloucester, and end the war, so far as the mounted forces are concerned.

Although there had been a few mounted men in King Philip’s War and in some of the Spanish expeditions, the Revolution was the first war in which cavalry as such was used on this continent. To be sure, the number of mounted troops on both sides was small, but we must remember that the entire forces engaged in most of the battles of the Revolution seem inconsiderable to us. In that war, however, our ancestors, though without previous experience, developed cavalry from a social organization into a military arm, learned the true cavalry spirit, trained competent cavalry leaders, and set for the mounted arm of the United States Army the example which was to reach its full development in both the Union and Confederate cavalry of 1861-5, and in the mounted troops which in the years following opened up the Western States to civilization.

**Jeb Stuart was said to have remarked:** In selecting squadron and troop officers, I seek boldness—boldness with that degree of studied rashness that comes from a rich mixture of common sense and judgment.
The U.S. Cavalry Association would like to thank Tractor Supply of Manhattan and Salina, Kansas and managers Brett Perkins and Justin Blew for their support.
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